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# Fostering democracy in eastern Europe.

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FOSTERING DEMOCRACY IN EASTERN EUROPE

A Thesis Presented

by

ANDREAS STAAB

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University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of

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
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
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
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
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# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the Cold War and with the collapse of the socialist-Communist system in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, three countries from the former Warsaw bloc gained worldwide attention to their transitions to democratic systems. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary established democratic regimes shortly after their peaceful transformations in the fall of 1989. Over a period of nearly three years, the model of a liberal, west European type of democracy with free market capitalism has been these countries' guideline for creating more prosperous nations. Eastern Europe swept aside the former systemic antagonism that existed between democracy and communism and is moving towards integration within the western world.

This process raises parallels to recent European history. Merely twenty years ago, Portugal and Spain sought their post-authoritarian future within the European Community. In various aspects the Iberian nations experienced problems similar to those currently existing in Eastern Europe. Their economies were inefficient and were forced to undertake an intensive process of modernization in order to achieve competitive standards. With the advent of democracy and capitalism, the people were confronted with a change of their traditional way of life. Values and



attitudes shifted due to the implementation of a liberal political system. The Iberian societies suffered from decades of authoritarian rule. The democratic roots among people and institutions were shallow. A democratic commitment from elites and citizens, and a variety of democratic associations and interest groups had to be developed.

The similarities to the current situation in Eastern Europe are evident and therefore suggest a comparative analysis. This study tries to draw conclusions for the political processes in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, by trying to use the experiences of the two Iberian nations as useful examples and a model for the Eastern European transition towards democracy.

The research concentrates on the process of establishing the new democratic regimes on a firm and permanent basis. Among various aspects which are essential to implement a stable democracy, the focus will be exclusively on two significant threats: civil-military relations and the requirement of a new security concept.

Due to its potency in terms of manpower and the use of force, the military apparatus represents a potential threat to any political regime. Thus, the integration of the military into democratic society and the establishment of civil supremacy constitutes an essential task for Eastern Europe in order to reduce the internal risk of a military

coup and a return to authoritarian rule. The research tries to develop a normative concept of civil-military relations in a democratic system and asks, in what ways have the Eastern European nations succeeded or failed so far, by showing parallels to the Iberian cases.

Security threats impose a further risk for the democratic transition. External threats, such as possible challenges to the countries' geographical boundaries, border violations or refugee problems arose from the civil wars on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and the general dissolution of the Warsaw Pact with the rapid but yet highly unpredictable changes in the republics of the former Soviet Union.

With the implementation of democracy and capitalism, various internal threats, such as a discontent with the political system, the economic situation or ethnic tensions are potential sources for instability. The study intends to illustrate the various threats and possible capacities to diminish or control them, set against the situation in Spain and Portugal during their transitions.

The developments after autumn 1989 ended the forty-year long division of Europe and the antagonism of two opposing societal and economic ideologies. History offers Europe a unique chance: the unification and integration of east and west. Western outside powers have a key-position in this

process due to their economic and financial capacities and the function of the west-European type of democracy as a role-model for the new regimes.

Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia are reducing state expenditures and controls, privatizing state-industries and lifting restrictions on trade and investment. The political system pursues a democratic path with the formation of a pluralist party-system and the introduction of free elections and democratic local and federal authorities. These processes, however, cause hardship and provoke political resistance from those who depended on state protection and profited from the communist regime. The transformation from communism to democracy represents an economically as well as socio-politically unique historical case. If those experiments fail, a return to authoritarian regimes, including oppression of minorities, threats against the western world and waves of immigrants will almost be certain.

The recent example of Lithuania shows that the path towards democracy is far from being secured against authoritarian setbacks. In November 1992, the Lithuanian voters, confronted with severe economic difficulties repudiated the Sajudis movement that brought them independence. Instead, a party of former communists was given a working majority in a new Parliament.

Fostering democracy in Eastern Europe is therefore not only a moral duty but furthermore strategically logical. Democratic countries do not go to war with each other or sponsor terrorism. Democratic countries are more reliable and open trading partners and offer more stable investment opportunities. Democratic countries respect civil liberties, rights of property and justice and are therefore more reliable partners to build a safer and more prosperous Europe based on peace and cooperation.

Therefore, the concluding part of the study tries to demonstrate where help, advice and guidance by western powers is needed. How can western powers assist and even foster the integration process of the Eastern European militaries? How can they support the development of a new security concept to counterbalance the various threats?

The study focuses on the particular outside powers of the European Community, its individual member states as well as the United States. Again, the cases of Spain and Portugal serve as a comparative base, trying to illustrate when and under what circumstances western powers offered helpful assistance or disclosed detrimental failures.

When thinking of the democratization processes in Southern Europe in the 1970's, one might ask why Greece is not included in this study. This country also freed itself from authoritarian rule in the mid-1970's. Greece

experienced a revolution from above. The military apparatus -the key power-holder of the system- initiated the transformation; a process comparable to that of Eastern Europe where reformist factions of the communist parties started the democratization. Also, as in the cases of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Greece viewed the European Community as a safeguard for the establishment of democracy, as well as for social and economic enhancement.

But on the other side, the Greek experience with authoritarian rule was simply too short to be valid for a comparative study. In the years following World War II and the German occupation the country suffered from a civil war. In 1949 however, the communist forces were defeated and the constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary system was reestablished. The military regime lasted only for seven years. In the period between 1967 and 1974 the colonels hardly managed to institutionalize authoritarianism and failed to consolidate their power.<sup>1</sup> After the coup, democratic attitudes, values, and practices were far from being erased from the Greek society. This was a decisive advantage for the democratization of Greece and a clear distinction from Eastern Europe, where societies were shaped and dominated by forty-five years of Communism, with people being deeply affected by authoritarian rule.

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<sup>1</sup> Harry Psomiades, 1982, p.251



In Eastern Europe two generations grew up without having any form of democratic experience. A tight ideological framework and a complex security apparatus dominated the individual and streamlined entire societies. Thus, the building of a new democratic society is far more complicated in such an environment. Democratic values, forms of participation, simple cognitive aspects of pluralism need to evolve. People have to learn to participate in the transformation to a new system. This lack of democratic knowledge was not present in the case of Greece.

## CHAPTER II

### THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATION

#### A. The Research Agenda

For a stable democracy the integration of the military apparatus into the society and its subordination to a democratic executive is of vital importance. As Samuel Huntington noted, the military is shaped by two forces:<sup>2</sup> a functional imperative represented in the paramount task of maintaining the nation's security and a societal imperative where social forces, ideologies and institutions influence the apparatus. The interaction of these two forces are the nucleus of civil-military relations. Various theoretical aspects on this relation need to be mentioned.

#### 1. Structural Antagonism

Structural problems between the armed forces and a liberal-democratic society are manifold. According to Huntington, the military emphasizes the importance of the group as opposed to the individual. The efficiency of the military requires the subordination of the individual.<sup>3</sup> The core problem here is that the organization of the military apparatus follows a strictly hierarchical "top-down" pattern

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<sup>2</sup> Samuel Huntington, 1957, p.2

<sup>3</sup> see: Samuel Huntington, 1957, p.63

in order to maintain its combat capability. The individual soldier has to obey orders and the organization has to keep a high level of discipline to be effective. This contradicts the liberal attitudes of a democracy which emphasizes the self expression, primacy and value of the individual. Thus, the individual soldier has to learn to separate his role of citizen from that of soldier, while the overarching military apparatus needs to provide the disciplinary frame.

Furthermore, to maintain the standard of an effective army, the military needs to develop a certain amount of integrity. Huntington's imperative of the military's professionalism <sup>4</sup> (see II.A.3) requires autonomy for the apparatus to fulfill its purpose. Certain functions (see II.A.3) have to be performed exclusively by the military without any civil intervention. The tendency and danger of the formation of a state within a state is obvious. The military's emphasis on obedience and loyalty, fostered by its hierarchical structure and generated by its professional function has the capability to form peculiar attitudes, values and standards which do not necessarily reflect those of the rest of the democratic society.

In addition, the apparatus has a practical as well as a limited outlook on politics.<sup>5</sup> The military mind is more concerned with military capabilities of other states than

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<sup>4</sup> see: Samuel Huntington, 1957, pp.83

<sup>5</sup> see: Samuel Huntington, 1957, pp.64

with their political intentions. Its focus is on the relation between political goals and military means, because this directly affects security matters, which represent the *raison d'être* of the armed forces. This paramount concern with national security results in the quest for the strengthening of forces or budget increases.

Finally, the military has several advantages over civil organizations. According to S.E.Finer<sup>6</sup> the military is a highly organized institution due to its centralized command, its hierarchical structure, its discipline and its *esprit de corps*. Especially in changing societies, such as those in Eastern Europe, the military is often the best organized and most disciplined organization<sup>7</sup>. The superiority to other organizations is further enhanced by the military's monopoly on arms and its superiority in the means of applying force.

## 2. Civil-Military Tensions

These structural contrasts between the civilian and the military sector can under certain circumstances generate into severe tensions and can impose a vital threat to the political system. The conditions for this are as follows:

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<sup>6</sup> S.E. Finer, 1976, pp.6

<sup>7</sup> Constantine Danopoulos, 1988, p.6

First, a cognitive change on how the military views its own position in society: according to Amos Perlmutter,<sup>8</sup> a feeling of inferiority can be caused by a defeat in war, by a growing marginality of the military profession and a general decline in the reputation of the officer status or due to an apprehension that the civilian sector and politicians intend to bring change to the military organization and its status, which either pander to or injure its pride as an autonomous organization.

Second, the economic status of the individual soldier plays a decisive role. Skepticism towards a democratic system is increased if the civilian sector is unable to provide food and housing. As seen in the case of the German Reichswehr, personal material security is often a reigning concern among soldiers. In 1930, two junior officers were convicted of distributing Nazi propaganda material among fellow soldiers which was strictly forbidden by the Reichswehr military code. One of the accused published his motives:

"The need for earning bread becomes all-important. Soldiers turn into officials, officers become candidates for pensions".<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Amos Perlmutter, 1977, p.35

<sup>9</sup> in: S.E. Finer, 1976, p.51



A further example represents the current situation of the Red Army of the former Soviet Union.<sup>10</sup> The departure of forces from the Eastern European countries, the eastern part of Germany and the Baltic republics is hampered by the problem of providing housing or alternative jobs for those affected by reduction measures. A political system which is not able to provide a decent economic standard for the soldier is likely be confronted with pressure from the apparatus.<sup>11</sup>

Third, the apprehension of either military or civil sector, that the other side is doing an unacceptable job in securing national interests: tension can arise over such issues as mismanagement of military matters, a denial of resources or civilian interference in military decision making.<sup>12</sup> Also, the military might be forced to intervene in politics due to governmental failure. Corruption or political disorder serve as examples.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> see: Serge Schmemmann: "The Red Army fights a Rearguard Action against History",  
in: New York Times, March 29, 1992, p.E4

<sup>11</sup> These cognitive and economic intentions can be further classified into various motives, such as class interest, regional aspects, individual or corporate self-interest of the army. For a more detailed discussion see:  
S.E. Finer, 1975, p.20-53.

<sup>12</sup> see: Timothy Colton, 1990, p.9

<sup>13</sup> Timothy Colton, 1990, p.9

### 3. Objective Civilian Control and Professionalism

How can a civilian supremacy over the military sector - an essential for a democratic system- be established? Samuel Huntington discussed varieties of civilian control.<sup>14</sup> He opposed the concept of subjective civilian control which entails the maximizing of civilian power. The diversity, varied character and conflicting interests of various civilian groups would make it impossible to raise civilian power as a whole as opposed to the military. According to Huntington this idea would result in the maximizing of power of certain civilian groups exalting in the supremacy of "particular governmental institutions, particular social classes and particular constitutional forms".<sup>15</sup> In addition, the civilian supremacy would be guaranteed by civilianizing the military due to a denial of an independent sphere for the armed forces.

But this qualitative enlargement of civilian control and the reduction of military power could result in an ineffective army and could undermine military security. Thus, Huntington favors the concept of an objective civilian control. Here, instead of civilianizing, the military would be militarized, by maximizing its professionalism. This can be accomplished by a clear delineation between political and

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<sup>14</sup> Samuel Huntington, 1957, p.80-83

<sup>15</sup> Samuel Huntington, 1957, p.81

military roles, which would result in the military's devotion to strictly military matters. It would preserve the essential function of the army, increase military security, and furthermore subordinate the military under civilian supremacy by reducing its power "to the lowest level vis-a-vis all civilian groups".<sup>16</sup>

For Huntington, military professionalism consists of expertness, social responsibility, which includes information and advice to its client (i.e. the state) and a corporate identity.<sup>17</sup> Like other professions, the military develops its own identity and corporate unity due to its unique task. This represents the solution for Huntington to establish a civil supremacy. The more the soldier is engaged in his own technical realm, such as maintaining a combat-capability, technical handling of equipment, recruiting and training, the less he is likely to get involved in policy issues which do not directly affect him.

Huntington's concept however has significant limitations. As Timothy Colton<sup>18</sup> pointed out, the concept of professionalism cannot be precisely defined. Thus, military professionalism and its special tasks vary from culture to culture. Also a professional army does not

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<sup>16</sup> Samuel Huntington, 1957, p.85

<sup>17</sup> see: Samuel Huntington, 1957, p.8

<sup>18</sup> in: Timothy Colton, 1990, p.8

automatically produce efficiency. Furthermore, the military and civilian realm are not neatly separated. The provision and design of equipment and the proper handling later on for instance requires a cooperation between civil and military institutions. In addition, civilian organizations exist which are also interested in national security. Intelligence services or academia are such institutions that influence the security agenda of a country.

Furthermore, recent history provides an example of a highly professional army, -The German Reichswehr- which intervened heavily in politics during the era of the Weimar Republic.<sup>19</sup> The treaty of Versailles limited the Reichswehr to a size of 100,000 men. This fostered the development of a highly organized, disciplined, autonomous, and effective body. Its interference in politics was consistent, driven by an anti-socialist and anti-democratic creed. These attitudes made especially junior officers receptive to Nazi-propaganda. In 1923 and on several occasions from 1930 onwards, the army was in fact ruling Germany. Several Presidents took advantage of Article 48 of the Constitution, which gave the Head of State the authority to establish a personal government in a the State of Emergency, backed by military force. The "Reichswehr" showed that the provision of an autonomous realm and military professionalism alone are not sufficient to establish civil supremacy.

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<sup>19</sup> for detailed information see: S.E. Finer, 1976, p.26-53

Finally, according to S.E.Finer<sup>20</sup>, military professionalism tends towards a collision with the civilian sector. A highly professional military regards itself more as a servant to the state rather than to the government. The corporate identity and self-consciousness of the apparatus generates its own values and criteria for the notion of national interest. The controversy between General MacArthur and President Truman over the American involvement during the Korean War serves as a classic example. This attitude results in the perception that only the army is competent to judge on military matters. An intervention of civilian politicians in this realm can raise tensions, due to the military's perception that the civil sector went beyond its limits and competence.

Thus, the concept of objective civilian control and military professionalism, whose primary goal is an effective but politically less influential army, cannot by itself establish civilian supremacy. Huntington's concept is not the sole factor that inhibits the military from intervention. Apart from this material aspect of civil supremacy, from a clear definition of duties, authorities, and responsibilities for both the civilian and the military sector, the "military must also have absorbed the principle

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<sup>20</sup> for a more detailed discussion on these aspects see:  
S.E.Finer, 1975, p.21-23



of the supremacy of the civil power".<sup>21</sup> Not only from a formal, but also from a cognitive point of view must the apparatus accept civilian rule.

#### 4. The Civil-Military Relation: Formal Aspects

How can the civil-military relation be organized to provide for the establishment of a stable democratic system? As far as the functions of the military is concerned, Huntington's concept of objective civilian control and professionalism is valid.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, apart from being the guarantor of national security, the military should provide information and advice on military matters and has furthermore an executive function in implementing state decision. The military represents a purposive instrument, with the task and commitment to serve the state. As mentioned above, the military should be guaranteed a certain autonomy in strictly military matters to maintain its combat capability. This autonomy includes military training, recruitment, and maneuvers.

The functions of the civilian sector are as followed: Not too many civilian levels are to be found above the general staff. However, in order to maintain an effective functioning, civilians should have the decisive powers. This

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<sup>21</sup> S.E.Finer, 1975, p.24

<sup>22</sup> see: Samuel Huntington, 1957, pp.72

must include approval of the general strategic and tactic doctrines, decisions to go on/off alert and to begin/end a war, setting of the budget, and ratification of military law.

In addition, further civilian checks on the military can become necessary in order to prevent the development of a state within the state. Such measures could include the creation of a general civilian inspectorate of the army or an office that should be responsible for complaints, -both of civilians as well as military individuals- and of the compliance with civil rights and the military law. This measure was taken by West Germany and helped to control and integrate a military with a long authoritarian past into the new democratic society.

Civilian politicians should also retain a "military personnel role, reserving the right to select most senior officers and to review appointments at lower levels".<sup>23</sup> In addition, every soldier should be forbidden to run for any political post to prevent double functions of political and military assignments. This is a vital element for the reduction of an internal threat represented by the military. The apparatus should not be able to influence political decisions apart from its own realm. The superiority of the civilian sector has to be paramount.

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<sup>23</sup> Timothy Colton, 1990, p.9

## 5. The Civil-Military Relation: Cognitive Aspects

But legal and formal aspects do not represent the entire concern in the principle of civil supremacy. As discussed above, several factors can generate civil-military tensions, including first an economic stringency, second an alienation of the armed forces from society, third an inappropriate governmental behavior in handling sensitive and military-related issues, and fourth the mutual perception of both sectors, that the other side operates in an insufficient way.

The economic performance of the newly emerged democracies remains crucial to the support and commitment to democracy of any societal group, not only the military. This vital aspect will be further elaborated in chapter III.

As for the aspect of an alienated army it becomes obvious, that the military complex is in need of a new ideological base. Although its authority was curtailed by the former communist regimes (see II.B), the military still had a clear perspective of its duties. But for a transition to a stable democracy, the military apparatus needs to get an entirely new function and responsibility. The apparatus now, after the collapse of the former ideology and the regime which it was reared to serve, has to redefine its role as a servant to democracy, integrated within a pluralist society and under civilian rule.

But the adaptation to a new mode of politics in a democratic society is not one-sided. The civilian sector needs to acknowledge that the armed forces are an integral part of the democratic system. Its vital function as a guarantor for the national security gives the military an important position in the establishment of democracy. The civil sector needs to establish a notion of respect and acceptance of the autonomous realm of the armed forces in military matters. In the former communist countries of Eastern Europe, the military was clearly dominated by the civil sector, (see II.B.) and its autonomy was often relinquished for civil intervention.

Formal and legal aspects can channel the civil-military relation in the political routine of day to day procedures. Formality however must be accompanied by a democratic attitude and the conviction that the existence of both sectors as well as their cooperation are essential for the establishment of democracy. Only with this cognitive base is it possible to keep eventual civil-military tensions on a level which still allows for political, non-violent solutions.

## B. The Military Apparatus in Eastern Europe

What is the nature of the civil-military relation in a communist system and in particular in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe? For many years the dominant explanatory model for civil-military relations in communist countries has been a "totalitarian" approach, whereas the party rigorously dominated the military with terror and purges.<sup>24</sup> In recent studies on the Soviet Union however, scholars addressed the increasing role of the apparatus in the decision making process. Although excluded and isolated from politics under Stalin, the military emerged into a legitimate interest group in the "golden age" of Soviet civil-military relations under Brezhnev.<sup>25</sup> In addition, although Gorbachev's policies gave priority to consumer goods and civil technology, Glasnost still contributed to the break up of military isolation from politics.<sup>26</sup>

But the Soviet civil-military relations are not universally transferable to every communist system. The various degrees of authority and influence in such countries as Cuba or the former Yugoslavia under Tito indicate that general Soviet patterns are not necessarily valid for Eastern Europe.

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<sup>24</sup> see: Jonathan Adelman, 1982, p.2

<sup>25</sup> see: Timothy Colton, 1990, p.19-29

<sup>26</sup> see: Thane Gustafson, 1990, pp.358



However, the military in Eastern Europe was heavily influenced by the Soviet hegemony in the communist bloc. Military training and equipment had been standardized under Soviet supervision.<sup>27</sup> The military doctrine of the Soviet Union had over the years an increasing impact on Eastern Europe, for its forces represented a vital element in the case of a military confrontation in Europe with NATO. Thus, the military capacities and the presence of Soviet divisions constantly improved.

Furthermore, the aggressive Brezhnev Doctrine showed that the Soviet Union was determined to prevent autonomous national policies. The Damocles sword of a military intervention of Soviet troops in internal affairs was always hanging over the Eastern European countries.

A closer look however at recent historical events indicates a critical relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As noted by Dale R. Herspring, various incidents showed that Eastern European militaries sometimes were reluctant and counteractive to Soviet policies.<sup>28</sup> The militaries of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia sought for their own identities apart from being satellites for their

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<sup>27</sup> see: Ross Johnson, 1978, p.258

<sup>28</sup> Dale Herspring, 1989, p.133-143  
During the "Prague Spring" in 1968 Hungarian and Polish troops showed little enthusiasm for the police action of the Pact-forces. In Poland in the 1980's, despite the imposition of martial law and the Solidarity movement, the military remained mostly neutral. In Hungary in 1956, some Hungarian units fought against Soviet troops.

powerful "brother". Bilateral and sometimes trilateral cooperation among Eastern European armies increased in the 1970's whereas the Soviet Union was only minimally involved.<sup>29</sup> These events generated a skeptical attitude of the Soviet Union towards its alliance partners with a continued concern over Eastern Europe's loyalty and the stability of its forces.

Also, the historic conditions for Eastern Europe in establishing communist regimes differ sharply from that of the Soviet Union. The communist system in the Soviet Union emerged out of a revolution and the Red Army was shaped into an effective body during the civil war. On the contrary, the communist parties in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary suffered from a lack of support among the population. Furthermore, the creation of a legitimate and effective army in all three countries would have been a long process<sup>30</sup> due to the need to incorporate various groupings with different political backgrounds of a non-communist past.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Dale Herspring, 1989, p.139

<sup>30</sup> see: Andrzej Korbonski, 1982, p.121

<sup>31</sup> In Poland the following groupings had to be integrated:

- the Soviet-led Polish army founded in the USSR
- the Communist armed underground; the People's Army
- the non-communist armed underground; the Home Army
- members of the prewar Polish Army released from German captivity
- members of the Polish army in the West who decided to return to Poland after the war

in: Andrzej Korbonski, 1982, p.110

These differing historic conditions imposed various consequences on the Eastern European militaries. First, the skepticism of the Soviet Union towards its WTO partners resulted in a low standard of equipment among Eastern European forces,<sup>32</sup> while better weapons went to other regions such as the Middle East.<sup>33</sup> Therefore, the Eastern European regimes had to rely on the Soviet Union for their external security due to the lack of capable and effective armies.<sup>34</sup>

Second, the distrust of the regimes towards the military in terms of its political conformity with the communist ideology resulted in a penetration and a control by secret police forces.<sup>35</sup> The military apparatus was far

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During the development of the new armed forces in Czechoslovakia between 1945 and 1948, the officer corps was extremely heterogeneous: Some communist sources even lamented the "bourgeois" nature of the new cadre.  
in: Jiri Valenta, 1982, p.131

In Hungary the organizers of the newly communist army had severe problems in finding political reliable but also well trained officers. The regime tried to circumvent the personnel shortage by establishing a system of dual controls which placed a political officer next to a military commander.  
in: Ivan Volgyes, 1978, p.150

<sup>32</sup> see: Dale Herspring, 1989, p.144-146

<sup>33</sup> Ross Johnson, 1978, p.262

<sup>34</sup> see: Jonathan Adelmann, 1982, p.11

<sup>35</sup> see: Jonathan Adelmann, 1982, p.8

from being an autonomous actor. It was in fact under civil domination of the Communist party. The civil supremacy was absolute with the effect of an isolation of the military from the decision making process.<sup>36</sup>

In conclusion, the authority of the Eastern European military was limited in two ways. On one side, the domestic regimes curtailed its autonomy on the national level. On the other side, the Soviet hegemony in the WTO provided for a further restriction. The lack of identity and an ideological base was evident. In defending their countries, the regimes relied on an outside power - the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the armies found themselves neglected actors in the political process, almost alienated from the political system. Thus, an ideological identity was to a large extent non-existent.

This non-identity can now represent a positive factor for the establishment of democracy. Now it is by far easier for the Eastern European countries to develop a new ideological base. Instead of being involved and integrated into a military bloc, controlled and dictated by a superpower and an aggressive (Brezhnev) doctrine, the Eastern European militaries now can redefine their function in serving their own countries. The possibility of a reemergence of national pride, a notion of independence, makes the militaries responsive to changes within the

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<sup>36</sup> Jiri Valenta, 1982, p.129

countries. The idea of change is paramount. The transitions to democratic regimes provide these changes, making the militaries receptive.

Again, a further remark on the importance of the economic aspect seems appropriate. Although the Eastern European militaries support the creation of new societies, the amount of energy and approval of the democratization processes will largely depend on a material security. Without it, the current positive attitude towards the change can turn into disappointment and a search for new concepts.

### 1. Poland

Following the presidential elections in December 1990 and the parliamentary elections a year later, Poland implemented various measures to establish a democratic civilian rule over the armed forces and to reduce the military threat to society.

Poland reduced its forces and equipment.<sup>37</sup> The government emphasized the conversion to produce civilian

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<sup>37</sup> In the past three years, the Polish armed forces have been constantly reduced. After a reduction of 33,000 soldiers in 1989, the overall strength in 1990 amounted to 314,000 men, 108,000 of them professional. Reductions for 1990 included 450 tanks, 200 guns and mortars and 100 armored transports; in: Harold Orenstein, 1990, p.66  
In June 1991 the overall strength was 305,000 men (114,000 professionals); in: Europa, 1992, Vol.II, p.2250



goods. The anticipated annual tank production for instance, for the years 1991 until 1995 is expected to amount to only thirty, as compared to a production capacity of 250.

In terms of institutional arrangements, the President is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and is also the head of the National Defense Committee that directs the military in peace time. The Ministry of National Defense executes the directives given to it by the Defense Committee.<sup>38</sup> On the governmental level two new civilian vice ministers of defense, Bronislaw Komorowski and Janusz Onyszkiewicz were appointed in April 1990.<sup>39</sup> In December 1991, a civilian, Jan Parys, succeeded Vice Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczy, who had been in office since July 1990, as Minister of Defense.<sup>40</sup>

In addition, the Polish parliament introduced a bill which banned professional soldiers from membership in all political organizations and required conscripts to suspend their membership in political organizations during their time of service.<sup>41</sup> In an effort to reduce the communist influence in the armed forces every political organ of the former Communist party and all party organizations within the army had been resolved. In addition, a fundamental

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<sup>38</sup> Jerzy Markowski, 1990, p.273.

<sup>39</sup> Harold S.Orenstein, 1990, p.71

<sup>40</sup> in: Osteuropa, August 1992, p.A430

<sup>41</sup> in: Harold Orenstein, 1990, p.65

recasting of positions throughout the apparatus took place.<sup>42</sup> Also, the withdrawal of armed forces from the former Soviet Union should be completed by November 1992.<sup>43</sup>

Furthermore, the Polish military set forth a new ideological orientation. The constitution Act, article eight notes, that "The Polish Armed Forces stand guard over the sovereignty, security and peace of the Polish nation".<sup>44</sup> According to Poland's former vice minister of national defense Bronislaw Komorowski, the "army must be...an element for securing Polish democracy".<sup>45</sup> Here, the army is trying to reintroduce historic values which focus on honor, tradition and the service to the nation, including a depoliticization from Marxist traditions<sup>46</sup> which should replace the former communist values and the ideological orientation towards a confrontation with the West.

Thus, a complex restructuring process was imposed on the military. The military-educational system was reformed with the founding of the new National Defense Academy. The new institution is directly subordinated to the minister of defense, whereas the faculty members are military men. The

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<sup>42</sup> in: Osteuropa, August 1992, p.A430

<sup>43</sup> Europa, 1992, Vol.II, p.2250

<sup>44</sup> in: Jerzy Markowski, 1990, p.269

<sup>45</sup> in: Peter Podbielski, 1990, p.72

<sup>46</sup> see: Peter Podbielski, 1990, p.72

Academy emphasizes not only military aspects, but social sciences are also integrated in the academic schedule, with the aim of educating a future officer, who "consciously and actively participates in the nation's sociological processes".<sup>47</sup> Religion, which was oppressed in the days of the "people's army" again is allowed to play an important role. With the establishment of the position of a military bishop ordinary,<sup>48</sup> the military respects the deep rooted religious consciousness prevalent in society.

But the current situation is not as optimistic as it might appear. The Polish military has problems in gaining acceptance and respect among large parts of the population. Although the military can look back on a long and glorious tradition of service to the nation, the suppressions of worker unrest in 1956 and 1970 and in particular during the imposition of martial law under General Wojciech Jaruzelski attributed to a skeptical and pessimistic view of the military. The attitude of the public could result in an isolation of the military from society.

The prestige of the profession of a soldier has decreased, elucidated by severe problems of the military in attracting new recruits and officers. This tendency seems remarkable against the background of high unemployment throughout the country. The problem surmounted to such

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<sup>47</sup> in: Peter Podbielski, 1990, p.75

<sup>48</sup> in: Osteuropa, August 1992, p.A434-438

levels that the military worries about the fulfillment of its functions in future years. Material reasons, such as lack of housing and a scarcity of jobs for family members in several -often remote- garrison towns are regarded as the main causes.<sup>49</sup>

The economic prospect for the military appears rather critical. The defense budget of 1990 was 20 percent lower than that of 1987 (in real terms). Sixty percent was spent on wages, maintenance, uniforms, and medical services.<sup>50</sup>

In sum, Poland undertook a heavy reduction of its forces in order to reduce the internal threat of political pressure by the military. Several constitutional arrangements account for the establishment of civilian supremacy. Civilian influence within the armed forces and in particular communist organs has been eased. The armed forces are trying to find a new identity and ideological base, grounded in democracy, religion, the defense of the country and national heritage. This process is clouded by the lack of acceptance of the military among the population and the declining prestige of the military profession, which could lead to an alienated army, whereas the military is not incorporated into the democratic society. In addition, an overall stringent economy and a further deterioration of the

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<sup>49</sup> in: Osteuropa, August 1992, p.A432-434

<sup>50</sup> Jerzy Markowski, 1990, p.271

state finances can endanger the material standard of the soldier. Thus, the military in Poland represents a threat to the establishment of democracy.

## 2. Hungary

Hungary made a rapid transformation from a one-party rule of the Communist party to a multi-party democratic system. But the political revolution of the late 1980's which ignited the democratization processes in Eastern Europe hindered a careful elaboration of the country's constitution.<sup>51</sup> Thus, a clear distinction of functions and authorities between the political units is missing. This "constitution-crisis" has also implications on the formal aspects of civilian supremacy over the military. In a decision on the authorities of the President, the Supreme Court referred largely to military competence and tried to adjudicate over differing interpretations of the constitution.<sup>52</sup>

Thus, the Hungarian armed forces are led by their commander in chief, currently General Lieutenant Kalman Lörincz. But the commander is dependent on the directives of civilian authorities. In peacetime, the ministry of defense represents the authority. In times of a crisis, the decision

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<sup>51</sup> see: Osteuropa, May 1992, p.A282

<sup>52</sup> see: Osteuropa, May 1992, p.A285-A288

to go on/off alert and the engagement of the armed forces in both domestic and foreign conflicts belongs to the government which needs a two-thirds approval from parliament.

Therefore, Hungary follows a traditional pattern of civil supremacy, prevalent in other European states. The military is given an autonomous realm in operating the armed forces, whereas in political decisions which transcend the realm of strictly military matters, civilian levels represent the final authority.

In trying to reduce the former communist influence over the apparatus, Hungary stressed a policy that seeks officers who cannot be strongly identified with the country's communist past for the highest military posts. In decreasing the internal threat which the apparatus can impose on the democratic system, the country undertook measures of reductions in size,<sup>53</sup> set forth by the new defense policy which is based on the assumption that smaller forces have to be capable of providing for the national security.<sup>54</sup> In addition, officers over 55 were being pensioned and 15 from

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<sup>53</sup> Total strength of the Hungarian armed forces:  
1991: 86,500 (45,900 conscripts)  
1988: 99,000 (64,000 conscripts)  
Source: Europa, 1992, Vol.I, p.1329; 1989, Vol.I, p.1262

<sup>54</sup> Osteuropa, May 1992, p.287



the country's 39 generals in leading posts were retired.<sup>55</sup>

An increasing westernization of the Hungarian military ideology can be recognized. A striking symbol is the replacement of two MIG aircraft by F-16 airplanes, provided by the United States.<sup>56</sup> In addition, a formal diplomatic relationship with NATO was established through the Hungarian embassy in Brussels. This policy represents a radical step. Shortly after the overthrow of the communist regime, the former member of the Warsaw Pact uttered its desire to leave the organization by the end of 1991. In 1990, Hungarian forces already stopped taking part in WTO exercises and in June 1991 the last Soviet soldier left the country. Instead, Hungary sought military cooperation with the West in the fields of drug traffic and terrorism. The culmination of this new orientation was the suggestion by the Defense Committee of the Hungarian parliament in September 1990, to send a battalion to Saudi Arabia to join the forces of the United Nations in the wake of the Gulf war.

Hungary seeks for a modernization as well as a reduction of its armed forces in order to create an effective army for the defense of the country. This change of perspective -from an aggressive WTO-doctrine to a defensive character- is indicated by a statement of Defense

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<sup>55</sup> Stephen Bowers, 1991, p.287

<sup>56</sup> in: Stephen Bowers, 1991, p.288

Minister Lajos Für who sees the base of the Hungarian security in diplomacy and politics, whereas the military is for the sole purpose of defending the national sovereignty.<sup>57</sup>

The attitude of the Hungarian population towards the military is one of skepticism. The armed forces are further confronted with a "historical lack of legitimacy"... and with a "powerful antimilitary sentiment in society".<sup>58</sup> The respect towards the soldier decreased constantly throughout the communist period. Although some units fought against Soviet troops in the uprising of 1956, the military as a whole stayed out. And although the apparatus held a skeptical attitude towards the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, it still never challenged the political authority. Its political significance was minor, indicated in the fact that Hungary never had a minister of defense on the Politburo.<sup>59</sup> Instead it followed the party directives and showed little interest in the political process.<sup>60</sup>

To integrate the military into an integral part of society it is vital for the armed forces to regain a

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<sup>57</sup> in: Osteuropa, May 1992, p.A281

<sup>58</sup> Keith Crane, Steven Popper and Barbara Kliszewski, 1990, p.3

<sup>59</sup> Keith Crane, Steven Popper, Barbara Kliszewski, 1990, p.5

<sup>60</sup> for an historical background of the Hungarian military see: Ivan Volgyes, 1978, p.145-158

respected social status. The conditions are present, despite the experiences during the dark ages of Communism. Like its counterpart in Poland, the Hungarian military has a long tradition with a certain pride in serving the country. It remains necessary for the civil sectors of society to further foster the process of an integration of the apparatus. The military found a new ideological base in the defense of the country and an orientation towards a cooperation with the West. But for a full integration, the Hungarian society needs to be aware that an alienated army imposes a severe internal threat to democracy. Therefore a cognitive turnaround is necessary. Hungary needs to develop an attitude that the military is a vital element of a democracy with its important function as a guarantor for national security.

In sum, Hungary took important measures in establishing civilian supremacy. The country reduced communist influence over the military and further diminished a possible internal threat imposed by the military on democracy by a reduction in size. Cooperation with NATO and western countries and the sole purpose of the army to defend the country has the capacity to serve as a new ideological base, whereas the forced retirement of former army generals indicates a further break with the past. Despite these positive developments, the danger of an alienated army is still

present due to a skeptical attitude of large parts of the population.

### 3. Czechoslovakia

Since the "Velvet Revolution" in December 1989 the country implemented a variety of reforms to incorporate the military into the democratic system and to guarantee civilian rule. The Defense Act of 14 March 1990 notes that "soldiers in active service, except soldiers summoned to military exercises, have their membership and activities in political parties and movements suspended".<sup>61</sup> A "Czech Army Council on Cooperation with the Public" was introduced with the task to pay attention to the individual's right on security interests and the influence of interstate ethnic relations on national security issues.

A civilian, Lubos Dobrovsky, replaced General Miroslav Vacek as defense minister in October 1990 to reassert civilian control. In addition, the position of a general inspectorate for the army was created. The inspectorate, independent from the ministry of defense and chosen by parliament, cooperates with civilian representatives and consults with the ministry of internal affairs and the ministry of defense. The task of the new agency is to

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<sup>61</sup> The following set of reforms is drawn from:  
Timothy Thomas, 1991, p.47-52

control reorganization, modernization and professionalism of the military.

Also former President Havel intended to make the defense budget information public, by reporting it to the "Parliamentary Military and Security Committee". In addition, the military office of the President is in charge of ensuring communication between the President and the ministry of defense. Finally, the military office of the President is responsible for letters from the public, concerning military affairs.

Czechoslovakia is undergoing heavy reductions in size and a process of restructuring. Through 1992, the country will reduce the forces to 130,000 men, down from an overall strength of 208,000 soldiers in 1988.<sup>62</sup> Until 1996 a professionalization of 50 per cent is planned.<sup>63</sup> The defense budget was cut by 40 per cent (adjustment of inflation) in 1990 from 35.6 billion to 31 billion koruny. Expectations accounted for 26.5 koruny by the end of 1991.

To ease the tensions between the civil and military sectors of society, conscript service was reduced from 24 to 18 months and will be even further cut to 12 months in late 1993. Further innovations are a civilian service option (27 month), new food allowances, longer leave time and the introduction of religious services. The overall goal is to

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<sup>62</sup> in: Europa, Vol.I, 1989, p.836

<sup>63</sup> Timothy Thomas, 1991, p.52

make the military service more humane, thus preventing a negative attitude of the people and especially of the conscripts towards the military -a step towards an integration into the new society. To foster the achievement of this goal, the ministry of defense "Educational and Cultural Administration" was founded in 1990 to further reduce the gap between military and society. The institution is responsible for formulating and implementing state educational and cultural policies in the army.

In providing a new ideological base for the military, the CSFR formulated its own doctrine, based on the premise of a "reasonable defensive sufficiency".<sup>64</sup> As opposed to the former doctrine, dominated by the military staff, influenced and even corrected by the Soviet military, the new ideology is defensive and non-aggressive. But the provision of a secure cognitive base within the realm of a democratic society is as yet incomplete. The military's performances in recent history made the people skeptical towards the military. This attitude is indicated by the numerous civilian checks on the apparatus.

During the era of the Warsaw Pact, the Czech military was overpowered by the Soviet dominance. Also, in confrontational situations such as Hitler's invasion in 1939, the Prague Spring in 1968 as well as during the

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<sup>64</sup> Military Doctrine of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in: Timothy L.Thomas, 1991, p.53



"Velvet Revolution", the military acted with restraint. In addition, according to Jiri Valenta,<sup>65</sup> the country can be described as "simply antimilitary... where the use of force runs contrary to the state's cultural values".

The recent reluctance of the military in defending the country, supporting democracy and its past association with an unpopular communist regime make the process of integration difficult. The task is to develop an ideological base, consisting of the pride to protect the country's sovereignty as well as a changing of the public's attitude, which currently regards the military as "subservient, expensive and useless."<sup>66</sup> It will further reduce the gap between civilians and the military and will provide for a cognitive integration -in this case the recognition of the necessity of the armed forces- into the democratic society.

The recent discussion over the future of the country, whether it be as a loose union or as two independent and separate states<sup>67</sup> further increases the uncertainty of the status of the military. It remains essential to exclude the military from this controversy. An involvement in this dispute could result in a civil war, with units taking a position on either the Slovak or the Czech side. The federal

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<sup>65</sup> Jiri Valenta, 1982, p.130

<sup>66</sup> in: Jiri Valenta, 1982, p.130

<sup>67</sup> see: New York Times, June 21, 1992, p.3

government showed sensitivity and political wisdom in rejecting the use of force against possible separatist movements in Slovakia and to prevent an involvement of the army in solving ethnic conflicts.<sup>68</sup> It seems as if Czechs and Slovaks will handle this precarious situation without any use of violence, further stressed by the fact that historically military conflict between these two ethnic groups is nonexistent. But the rising tensions might serve as a breeding ground for military intervention if the situation remains unstable and unclear.

In sum, Czechoslovakia made important steps towards an integration of the military into the democratic society. The constitution as well as the political praxis provide for civilian control over the apparatus. A variety of measures were implemented to ease the tensions between the civil and the military sectors of society. The internal threat of political pressure or even a coup was limited with a reduction in size.

The cognitive integration is as yet incomplete. Skepticism of the population towards the armed forces prevails, while an incorporation into the society is further hindered by an uncertainty over the country's future which

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<sup>68</sup> Havel on "Radio Free Europe", 25 March 1991, in: Timothy L. Thomas, 1991, p.51

could generate emotions of dissatisfaction on parts of the military with the democratic development.

### C. The Military in Spain

#### 1. The Position in the Authoritarian Regime

In the Franco system the military was the main stabilizing force of the regime. The apparatus formed a closed institution within the state, entirely isolated from the processes of liberalization and democratization occurring in the late years of the dictatorship. As Benny Pollack describes it,

"the armed forces had been almost completely cut off from progressive, modernizing sectors of Spanish society and remained the staunchest defenders of the traditional order, ... ideologically saturated by the anti-liberal, anti-democratic value-system of the old regime".<sup>69</sup>

During the dictatorship, the apparatus was the center of political life,<sup>70</sup> the source for the country's unity and stability. In the beginning of the democratization process, the military was unable to adapt to the new system. It maintained an isolated status and found it difficult to confront the rising problems, such as crime, terrorism,

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<sup>69</sup> Benny Pollack, 1987, p.156

<sup>70</sup> Edward Moxon-Browne, 1989, p.18

autonomy claims by various regions, or societal changes such as the new laws on abortion or divorce. This anti-democratic attitude can be further explained by the loss of the powerful role that the military previously occupied in the Franco-regime. One-third of all Franco's ministers were Army officers. In contrast, only one officer held a position in the Government of 1978.<sup>71</sup>

## 2. The Transition and Reforms

The new Spanish democracy initially failed to incorporate the military. The military's skepticism towards the new system and the government's struggle to control crime and terrorism culminated in the coup attempt on February 23, 1981. The putsch failed due to disagreeing sections in the Army and the firm action of King Juan Carlos and his support for the constitution and the parliamentary system. However, not only in 1981 but also in 1978 and in 1982 was the Army involved in attempted coups.

After 1982 things changed. With the socialist government of the PSOE in power, backed up by a clear majority in parliament and not as fragile as the former

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<sup>71</sup> Although the military's influences on politics decreased significantly, the apparatus still held the important position of First Deputy Prime Minister, who was responsible for Defense and Military matters. This position was taken by Lt.General Manuel Gutierrez Mellado; in: Europa Yearbook, Vol.I, London, 1979, p.1110

Christian-Democratic (UCD) governments, the civil sector of society gained control over the military.

In 1981, one year before the PSOE came to power, the Army was still heavily overstaffed. Its size even increased compared to the last year of the Franco regime.<sup>72</sup> At the center of the problem was the officer corps. Although in 1978 the UCD government abolished the guarantee that every officer would end his career with at least the rank of brigadier general, he still had the right to reach colonel. Thus, promotion was based on age rather than ability. Furthermore, Spanish officers tended to be ten years older on average than other NATO officers.<sup>73</sup> Thus, the impact of younger military officers who were brought up during the opening to western ideas and democracy was still kept to a low level. This was especially important, for elder officers served under the Franco regime and tended towards former traditions and privileges.

The Socialist government undertook an ambitious and costly program of reorganization and modernization of the military. Its intention was twofold: first, to neutralize the apparatus as an internal threat and second, to bring the

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<sup>72</sup> Total strength of the Spanish armed forces:  
1975: 302,000, compulsory service of 18 months.  
1981: 342,000 compulsory service of 15 months.  
in: Europa, Vol.I, 1976, p.1069 and Vol.I, 1982, p.1076

<sup>73</sup> The Economist: 20 February 1988, p.48

military up to NATO-standards, which Spain joined in the summer of 1982. In addition, since the military budget was not affected by the heavy austerity measures imposed by Prime Minister Gonzales, spending on armaments soared, a reflection of the government's policy to increase technological standards. This happened also to please the military. As a natural reaction, an organization will be more supportive of a country and its government when it represents a chief beneficiary of modernization programs.

Technological modernization in this case fostered the integration of the apparatus into democracy. The defense budget of \$6.6 billion or 2.3 % of GDP in 1987 however was still below the modest average of the European members of NATO (3.4%)<sup>74</sup>. The ambition of the government was a reduction in size by 30 per cent until the year 2000, by reducing the period of service for conscripts and by pensioning off 25 per cent of the senior officers<sup>75</sup> to reduce the number of elder officers who previously served under Franco. As of June 1990, the total strength of the armed forces amounted to 274,500,<sup>76</sup> a reduction of 22 per cent since 1978.

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<sup>74</sup> Economist: 20 February 1988, p.49

<sup>75</sup> Edward Moxon-Browne, 1989, p.19

<sup>76</sup> in: Europa Yearbook, Vol.II, 1991, p.2408.  
The military service was still compulsory, lasting 12 months (to be reduced to 9 months during 1992). Conscripts totaled 200,900.



The constitution, approved by a popular referendum on December 6, 1978 inscribed the dominance of the civilian sector. The King holds the position of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of the Supreme Council of Defense. The Declaration of war and peace is announced by the king under the prior authorization of the Cortez, the Spanish parliament. A further step towards civilian supremacy was accomplished in 1982, when the Socialist government refused to give positions in the Cabinet to military officers.<sup>77</sup>

Furthermore, the integration in the North Atlantic Alliance (see also III.B.2) further bolstered the fragile democracy by giving the armed forces an external orientation and a role to play outside the country, thus keeping them out of internal politics. Multilateral cooperation and consultation are essential for NATO to maintain its security function. To achieve this goal, not exclusively civilian politicians but also military officers are integrated in the decision-making process. Issues concerning the modernization of technical equipment, strategic questions, or maneuvers require the involvement of the individual member states. The step towards NATO therefore represented the creation of a new ideological base for the Spanish military. The apparatus was now able to identify a common enemy and ceased to think entirely in internal terms, a role which they formerly

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<sup>77</sup> see: Europa Yearbook, Vol.I, 1983, p.1083-1085

played under the Franco regime. This transformation in ideology was vital for the securance of democracy. It was a shift from the center of the political life to contributing to the defense of the Alliance's southern flank.

In short, Spain was confronted with various difficulties in integrating the military into a democratic society. After Franco's demise, the apparatus maintained its position as a closed institution within the state with anti-democratic and anti-liberal attitudes. In the initial period of the transformation, the military was still dominated by older Franco-officers who obstructed an adaptation to the progressive and modernizing developments in the Spanish society. This opposition to democracy represented an internal threat to the new political system, illustrated by various coups in the early 1980's. Spain responded with a reduction in size of the military and a pensioning off of senior officers. Constitutional regulations accounted for a civil supremacy. In providing a new ideological base and a distraction of the military from internal political matters, Spain achieved an incorporation into NATO, subsequently followed by a technical modernization.

## D. The Military in Portugal

### 1. The Position in the Authoritarian Regime

There were striking differences in the role of the army in the two Iberian nations during the transition period. In Spain, the military stood on the sidelines, while the gradual implementation of a democratic system was the result of negotiations between democratic opponents of Franco and his successors.<sup>78</sup> In Portugal, the army initiated the breakdown of the old system. The Spanish army represented a threat to democracy, while the Portuguese military directed the process of democratization. In Spain, the army was a rightist force while in Portugal it was leftist.

After the death of Antonio Salazar in 1970, his successor Marcello Caetano was incapable of leading Portugal out of an economic and political crisis. The coup of April 25, 1974 was triggered by two precipitants. An economic recession drove up prices, created social unrest<sup>79</sup> and made people responsive to changes. The costs for Portugal of fighting wars in Mozambique and Angola outweighed the economic advantages of retaining the colonies. A country with less than nine million people was sustaining an army of 200,000 men, while from 1969 to 1974, almost 40 per cent of Portugal's GNP was spent for military expenditures.<sup>80</sup> In

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<sup>78</sup> Kenneth Maxwell, 1982, p.241

<sup>79</sup> Kenneth Maxwell, 1982, p.235

<sup>80</sup> World Military and Arms Transfers, 1980, p.64

addition fractions of the armed forces were strongly opposed to the dictatorship. Caetano was incapable in offering a solution to break the deadlock situation in Africa.

The impact of ten years of colonial warfare in Africa was severe on the soldiers. Officer training for all candidates included exposure to the revolutionary ideology of potential adversaries.<sup>81</sup> The military service abroad broadened the horizon of military men, who became aware of the social, economic and political malaise at home.

These events generated the formation of a dissident organization, the Armed Forces Movement (AFM), a group of basically middle-ranked junior officers who executed an almost bloodless coup. The significance of the April coup is that no political party or ideological movement was involved<sup>82</sup>. The revolution was entirely initiated by a faction of the military. The response of the public was extremely positive. The AFM found a wide base of support among the people, who welcomed the change from years of dictatorial rule. As Kenneth Maxwell noted, "in Lisbon and Oporto, thousands of people poured into the streets and welcomed the army as liberators".<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> James John Tritten, 1979, p.58

<sup>82</sup> James John Tritten, 1979, p.60

<sup>83</sup> Kenneth Maxwell, 1982, p.231

## 2. The Transition and Reforms

After the coup, the military was able to keep a strong influence on politics. Until the end of 1975, the political vacuum left behind by the Caetano regime was filled with six provisional governments. These changing types of governments ranging from West-European pluralism to East-European socialism were not the result of a broad revolutionary movement, led by the AFM or any political party, but the maneuvering of different elite factions within the army which tried to gain control over an unstable political situation while being uncertain over the type of regime to be chosen.<sup>84</sup> The military represented the core of any political action. By that time, no political party and no broadly based revolutionary movement had the capability of directing the democratization process.

With the sixth provisional government, military discipline was finally restored<sup>85</sup> and a faction, led by General Antonio Ramalho Eanes gained power. Eanes saw Portugal's future in the realm of a civilian dominated, western-type democracy. With the election of a constituent assembly and a new constitution which was enacted on 25 April 1976, the power gradually shifted to civilian rule. But the military was still strong enough to determine the shape of the constitution. Although the document was the

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<sup>84</sup> see: Walter Opello, 1985, p.65-82

<sup>85</sup> Walter Opello, 1985, p.74

work of civilian political parties, left-wing officers had such an impact that Portugal's new constitution represented the "most radical in the western world".<sup>86</sup> Article 2 is a clear indication, for it pledged the country to ensuring

"the transition to socialism by creating  
the conditions for the democratic exercise  
of power by the working classes".<sup>87</sup>

In addition, article 273 gives the armed forces "the historic role of guaranteeing conditions which allow the peaceful and pluralist transition of Portuguese society towards democracy and socialism".<sup>88</sup> Furthermore, the document declared that education should promote a "classless society" and that political parties should participate in the revolutionary process.<sup>89</sup>

The Constitution incorporated a pact between the military and the major political parties which further documented the influence of the military to civilian rule. Under the pact, signed on February 26, 1976, the influence of the army in the political process was concentrated in a "Revolutionary Council". The 18-man council, headed by the President (who could be either civilian or a military officer) and composed of members of the armed forces, left

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<sup>86</sup> Tom Gallagher, 1985, p.203

<sup>87</sup> in: Tom Gallagher, 1985, p.203

<sup>88</sup> in: Economist, May 28, 1977, Survey p.7.

<sup>89</sup> see: Lester A.Sobel, 1976, p.138



decisive political powers to the military. The Council functioned as a advisory organ to the President and judged the constitutionality of legislation enacted by the National Assembly. Thus, it opposed attempts to privatize the economy.<sup>90</sup> In matters concerning defense as well as nationalizations the council had the power to veto over all legislation.<sup>91</sup> These supreme powers were finally relinquished in 1982, when the Council was abolished by a two-thirds majority in parliament and replaced by a mainly civilian Council of State.

The new Portuguese democracy was confronted with a military apparatus that had a significant impact on politics, backed up by a certain popularity among the people, while factions of the army obtained a revolutionary attitude. Therefore, the influence of the apparatus had to be decreased in order to create a stable democratic system based on civilian rule.

Portugal responded with a severe reduction in size. The army was scaled down from 200,000 in 1974 to under 40,000 in 1980.<sup>92</sup> Conscription existed, but with many exemptions, while the time of duty was cut down as well. The draft is

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<sup>90</sup> see: Kenneth Maxwell, 1982, p.243

<sup>91</sup> Tom Gallagher, 1985, p.203

<sup>92</sup> Kenneth Maxwell, 1982, p.243

now primarily used as an instrument of education, by applying it largely in areas where schooling is poor.<sup>93</sup>

Furthermore, the various Portuguese governments succeeded in pushing radical officers of the AFM out of the political and military realm of significance. The politicized units which were involved in the various quarrels for power in the two years following the coup have been disbanded.<sup>94</sup> Most of the AFM officers have been investigated, arrested, transferred to the reserves, or forced to resign. Others have been moved from command posts to the administration level.<sup>95</sup> The revolutionary element of the apparatus was further extinguished through a return to a traditional, more disciplined structure. In this context, the AFM general assembly - the soldiers' parliament - was replaced by a hierarchical command.

Portugal heavily cut its defense budget. In 1974 military expenditures amounted to 919 million dollars (6.8 per cent of the GNP) while the figures were 649 million dollars (3.5% of the GNP) in 1978.<sup>96</sup>

Another key element for the integration of the military into a democratic society represented the provision of a new ideological base for the military. Over ten years the

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<sup>93</sup> see: Economist, May 28, 1977, Survey p.9

<sup>94</sup> Economist May 28, 1977, Survey p.9

<sup>95</sup> Stephen Talbot, 1980, p.272

<sup>96</sup> World Military and Arms Transfers 1969-1978, 1980, p.64

Portuguese army was involved in colonial wars in Africa. As Douglas Porch noted, throughout the years of the Salazar regime, "indignation among many officers over the authoritarian nature of the state"<sup>97</sup> increased. The military fulfilled its function of serving the state, but the army "tolerated rather than supported the government".<sup>98</sup> Thus, the state of mind of the military complex was ambivalent. The notion of the nation's glory and imperial tradition was in contrast to the political involvement in shaping the new regime, whereas a radical part of the apparatus addressed political issues and played a vanguard role in the Revolution.

Here, Portugal succeeded in promoting a new role for the army in the defense of its continental territory and the securance of the democratic system. As General Eanes said, "the Army exists only to defend national interests, and to guarantee the institutions established by the freely expressed will of the people through their votes".<sup>99</sup>

The revised constitution of 1982, initially promulgated on April 2, 1976 further stresses the new function of the military within society: "the Portuguese Armed Forces shall

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<sup>97</sup> Douglas Porch, 1977, p.22

<sup>98</sup> Douglas Porch, 1977, p.23

<sup>99</sup> Economist, May 28, 1977, Survey p.7

safeguard national independence, unity of the State and the integrity of the national territory".<sup>100</sup>

It was vital for Portugal, to direct the concern of the military apparatus on external matters. With the independence of the former African colonies, Portugal was in desperate need for redefining the role for its military. Despite the securance of the State and therefore of democratic institutions, the Army should be kept out of internal politics. This goal was achieved through a further integration into NATO, which kept the armed forces occupied, and by reducing the temptation of political intervention. In the aftermath of the revolution, the Alliance feared that Portugal might fell under communist influence and therefore excluded the country from its sensitive nuclear planning group.<sup>101</sup> Today, Portugal has rejoined this committee.<sup>102</sup>

Furthermore, the Constitution manifests the superior role of the civilian sector over the military. Changes in the Constitution require a two-thirds majority. The budget, including the military budget needs to be approved by a majority of the assembly which also approves treaties. In 1982, military personal disappeared from posts in the government which was now entirely composed of civilian

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<sup>100</sup> in: Europa Yearbook, Vol.I, 1983, p.1027

<sup>101</sup> see: U.S. News and World Report, June 30, 1980, p.23

<sup>102</sup> for a further discussion on the relationship towards NATO see chapter IV.B.1

politicians.<sup>103</sup> The council of the Revolution was completely abolished by transferring its functions to several organs.<sup>104</sup> In 1986, the Presidency has been finally turned over to a civilian, former Prime Minister Mario Soares. This represents a remarkable step towards the establishment of civilian supremacy, for the Presidency, equipped with significant powers<sup>105</sup> has traditionally been the preserve of the armed forces.<sup>106</sup>

In sum, the Portuguese democracy decreased a possible internal threat of the armed forces. The Military initiated and directed the transition towards democracy. Over almost two years following the coup, Portugal was the plaything of some politically inexperienced officers. Only the seizure of factions within the military devoted to democracy provided for a gradual takeover by civilian leaders, who responded with a reduction in size and budget, the promotion of a new ideological base, and the exemption of radical officers from

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<sup>103</sup> see: Europa Yearbook, Vol.I, 1983, pp.1027

<sup>104</sup> the following organs took over the powers of the Council of the Revolution:  
Council of the State (new), the President, the Government  
the Constitutional Tribunal (new consisting of 13 judges),  
the Assembly, the Council of National Defense.  
in: Europa Yearbook, Vol.I, 1983, p.1013

<sup>105</sup> The President appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister, sets dates for elections, has the right to dissolve Parliament and presides over the Council of State.  
in: Europa, Vol.II, 1991, p.2204

<sup>106</sup> see: Douglas Porch, 1977, p.24

significant posts. With the revision of the constitution, the "Revolutionary Council" dissolved in 1982, and a civilian President, civilian authority was further established.

But still, the military represents a threat to democracy. As Tom Gallagher noted, "traditionally, many officers have viewed the army as an agency which has a duty to intervene in political life if the parties abuse the mandate they have received from the electorate".<sup>107</sup> Although a fragmentation of the party system, a difficult economic performance over a longer period that would augment social unrest and which would give the military the opportunity to intervene seems to be a worst-case-scenario, civil-military tensions should be treated with sensitive recognition.

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<sup>107</sup> Tom Gallagher, 1985, p.214



### CHAPTER III

#### THE NECESSITY OF A NEW SECURITY CONCEPT

To foster and stabilize the process of democratization it is necessary to establish a stable security agenda. For states as well as for individuals, enjoying security entails an effort to limit or even diminish threats. Threats to the democratic society can occur on two different levels - internal and external. It is the supreme task for the new democracies to establish capacities to counterbalance them. On the internal level, economic performance represents a paramount aspect. An unsatisfying material standard can generate into social unrest. Also, it is vital for the democracies to incorporate various social groups into the state or at least into their allegiance. As seen in chapter II, the military can impose a severe threat on the system. In addition, without the integration of minorities a security agenda is incomplete, and therefore gives way to political violence, ethnonationalism and probable separatist movements. Furthermore, Eastern Europe has to establish a security concept that manages external threats which run from border conflicts to the extreme of war.

## A. Eastern Europe

### 1. Internal Threats

The current situation in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary imposes a variety of internal threats to the newly established democracies. First, ethnonationalism: the general problem with ethnic minorities is their perspective of oppression with the denial of civil rights or economic opportunities in comparison to standards offered by the country of their ethnic origin. Such claims could result in demands for better political representation and economic equality but can also activate notions of nationalism in the home countries.

The result of the parliamentary election in Czechoslovakia in June 1992 transferred the "Movement for Democratic Slovakia", headed by Vladimir Meciar into the strongest political power in Slovakia. Meciar favors a loose confederation of two sovereign nations.<sup>108</sup> In the Federal Republic, Czechs represent two-thirds of the national population. The ethnic division of the country is further augmented in economic terms, for Slovaks live in the economically lesser developed part of the country.<sup>109</sup> Negotiations between the two sides accounted for the prospect of a limited federal government with the five

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<sup>108</sup> New York Times, June 21, 1992, p.3

<sup>109</sup> Daniel N. Nelson, 1991, p.139

ministries of defense, finance, interior, economics and foreign affairs.<sup>110</sup>

As in the case of Yugoslavia, Communism covered up ethnic and cultural differences. In Czechoslovakia however, both sides seem to agree to the process of the federation's split without the use of any violence. The union was artificial, backed up by a tight authoritarian regime. An eventual separation might even reduce ethnic tensions, given the historical fact that Slovaks and Czechs were never involved in any mutual armed conflicts.

In Hungary, gypsies and Rumanians represent minority groups, while Magyars are more than 90 per cent of the population.<sup>111</sup> In Poland, a German minority, centered in Silesia and part of Germany before World War II, has kept strong cultural traditions throughout the communist period. With the unification, the minority stressed their desire to join Germany.<sup>112</sup> These cultural and ethnic tensions in Poland<sup>113</sup> were suppressed by communist rule. They are now reaching the surface of the political process in the new democratic and pluralist society.

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<sup>110</sup> New York Times, June 21, 1992, p.3

<sup>111</sup> David Nelson, 1991, p.140

<sup>112</sup> David Nelson, 1991, p.140

<sup>113</sup> for a discussion on the border tensions between Germany and Poland see Chapter III.A.2

Second, there is a rejection of Capitalism and a feeling of disappointment among those societal groups which find it hard to adapt to the new political and economic system.<sup>114</sup> Communism provided a tight and safe social net for its citizens. The individual's life was organized, planned, and taken care of. The social welfare system provided a stable though not prosperous living standard for nearly all of the population. With the introduction of Capitalism, privatization, and the gradual decrease of the state's economic activity people had to organize their life for themselves. Competition for jobs, unemployment, drops in living standards -in general the adjustment to the lifestyle of liberal Capitalism- created political unrest and tension. As Vaclav Havel noted:

They (the people) did in fact hate the totalitarian regime, but at the same time, they spent their whole life in it, and in spite of their will, got accustomed to it. They became used to the fact that there is an omnipotent state over them that can do everything, take care of everything and is responsible for everything. One cannot just lose this habit overnight".<sup>115</sup>

The fear of taking risks, the stress of living without social certainties was completely new to populations which had not known unemployment for over forty years. Indications

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<sup>114</sup> see: New York Times: East Bloc Treads Water in an Ocean of Lethargy, April 08, 1992, p.A1

<sup>115</sup> in: New York Times, April 08, 1992, p.A12

of this negative attitude towards Capitalism fostered by a depressing economic environment can be seen everywhere throughout Eastern Europe. The suicide rate in Poland increased by ten per cent in 1991, while it reached a record-high in Hungary.<sup>116</sup> The Presidential election in Poland in November 1990 turned out to be a rejection of the economic policies of former Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki who only finished third in the race.

Third, there is an apathy towards the democratic political process mixed with an anger against the current ruling political elites. The malaise of the economic situation which has an impact on almost every individual's life created a "suspicion of governmental authority".<sup>117</sup> Some people blame the political elites, who are viewed as incapable of solving the social and economic problems. A mixture of frustration and disillusionment concludes in an apathy towards the political process.

Indications can already be seen throughout Eastern Europe. In the two Presidential elections in Poland in 1990 only sixty per cent and less than fifty per cent of the electorate voted. In local elections in Hungary and Poland turnouts were only one-third to two-thirds.<sup>118</sup> In a small

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<sup>116</sup> New York Times, April 8, 1992, p.A12

<sup>117</sup> David Nelson, 1991, p.141

<sup>118</sup> David Nelson, 1991, p.141

town in Poland with 595 voters, only one person cast his ballot<sup>119</sup>. Although low proportions are not uncommon in long-established democratic societies, in a young democracy after decades of authoritarian rule this indicates already a disinterest for political participation and the political process in general.

Such apathy and distrust towards the ruling governments give space for new political movements and ideas, which need not necessarily follow democratic patterns. The candidacy of Stanislaw Tyminski can be regarded as an example that showed the vulnerability of the political public to vote for candidates who do not present a program but a mere antithesis to the political establishment mixed with populist notions. The Polish emigrant Tyminski, a self-claimed, self made-millionaire, who flew in from Canada without a political organization and with hardly any campaigning finished second in the Presidential elections behind Lech Walesa.

Fourth, the old nomenclature: the former communist party-apparatus infiltrated all sectors of society. Recently, some post-communist leaders of Eastern Europe have been accused of prior cooperation with the Communist secret

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<sup>119</sup> New York Times, April 8, 1992, p.A12



police.<sup>120</sup> Although Eastern Europe expelled top officials of the communist parties from political positions, the web between party and state-bureaucracy was so close-meshed, that numerous party members and secret-police informers who kept the system working remained in government jobs. This former entanglement of party and state can delay or even damage the democratization process. Old attitudes, values and modes of behavior linger on and slacken the transformation from an authoritarian bureaucracy into an institution responsible to the democratic state.

Fifth, the economic performances of the particular countries play a crucial role (see also Table 1.). Economic growth is the financial base for the development of a society. The recent revolutions in Eastern Europe including East Germany proved that people also supported democracy for an eventual improvement of their own particular economic situation. This "promise" made by capitalism has to be fulfilled by the different countries in order to avoid

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<sup>120</sup> In Poland, former Prime Minister Jan Olszewski issued a list of members of the parliament who cooperated with the former secret police. The incident caused an uproar resulting in the ousting of Olszewski's government.

in: New York Times, 21 June, 1992

In Czechoslovakia, the Slovak parliament released a report linking the republic's most popular politician, Vladimir Meciar, to the secret police. Meciar denied the charges and gained a solid majority in Slovakia in the parliamentary elections of June 1992.

in: New York Times Magazine, 31 May 1992

Table 1. Economic Data on Eastern Europe

<u>Unemployment</u>	Czechoslovakia:	6.5 per cent	(December 1991)
	Hungary:	8.3 per cent	(December 1991)
	Poland:	12.2 per cent	(March 1992)
<u>Inflation</u>	Czechoslovakia:	2 per cent	(June 1991)
	Hungary:	35 per cent	(1991)
	Poland:	1266 per cent	(February 1990)
<u>External debt</u>	Czechoslovakia:	US\$ - 8,100 million	(1990)
	Hungary:	US\$ -20, million	(1990)
	Poland:	US\$ -39,282 million	(1990)
<u>GNP per head</u>	Czechoslovakia:	US\$ 3,450	(1989)
	Hungary:	US\$ 2,560	(1989)
	Poland:	US\$ 1,700	(1990)

source: Europa Yearbook, 1992, Vol.I p.887, 1329  
Vol.II, p.2250

disappointment and frustration which eventually lead to a disapproval of the democratic and capitalist system and to political unrest. The example of Argentina in the 1970's showed that a failure in improving the general standard of living endangers democracy and make people receptive to anti-democratic change.

With the transformation from a state economy to a market capitalism four major problems emerged, all similar in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. First, trade shocks: soon after the upheavals in Eastern Europe in the summer of

1989 trade with the Soviet Union began to decrease.<sup>121</sup> The USSR reduced its deliveries of oil and natural gas in order to export them for hard currency to the West. As a consequence, the artificial pricing system within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) came under severe pressure, and eventually led to the dissolution of COMECON in June 1991. Suddenly, Eastern Europe had to pay more for energy supplies and raw materials.

Furthermore the growing chaos in the Soviet economy further disrupted trade relations with Eastern Europe<sup>122</sup>. The USSR fell behind in its payments to East European suppliers, while the newly emerged republics declined to cover the debts. East European firms responded by withholding further supplies unless a bank guarantee was offered, thus reducing the amount of trade even further.

With German unification, trade relations of Eastern Europe with the GDR came to an end. East Germany represented a market for agricultural and industrial goods and provided scarce industrial components and high-technology products.<sup>123</sup> Also, western companies gained access to markets formerly dominated by communist state-economies, while the products of Eastern European enterprises have not been able to compete with western products. In addition,

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<sup>121</sup> Mark Kramer, 1992, p.136

<sup>122</sup> Mark Kramer, 1992, p.137

<sup>123</sup> Mark Kramer, 1992, p.138

trade among all Eastern European countries dropped significantly after the transformation to hard currency accounting within the COMECON system.

Second, privatization of former state owned enterprises has been hobbled by legal complications. Although Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia have implemented privatization programs, the legal situation of numerous cases is still unsolved. The issue circulates around two problems: the controversy of either restitution or compensation of formerly expropriated citizens and the pace of the reforms. Private property is a basic element of capitalism. It is a paramount necessity for the three nations to clarify the process of transformation from state into private ownership. Until then, due to this unstable situation entrepreneurs and companies will remain hesitant about investing in the market, for they might later have to face restitution claims.<sup>124</sup>

Third, the implementation of a market economy in Eastern Europe involves a set of reforms. Price liberalization, currency convertability, trade and banking reforms, privatization, labor deregulation and a macro economic stability are the goals set fourth by Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The actual timing of all these

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<sup>124</sup> see: Janusz Ordover, 1991, p.26-27  
Mark Kramer, 1991, p.139-144

measures represents a difficult task.<sup>125</sup> In the case of Poland, the country followed the concept of a "shock therapy", a radical shift towards Capitalism within a short period of time. Hungary and Czechoslovakia have taken gradualist approaches. Neither economists nor past experiences offer clear advice about how to proceed. The transformation of a centrally planned economy into a free market system represents an unparalleled experience, previously unknown in history.

Fourth, economic and political culture: forty years of Communism had a severe impact on the mentality of the people. The regime organized the individual's life. Jobs, social security, even leisure was to a large extent provided and controlled by the state apparatus. Life followed a beaten and streamlined track, apathy dominated. A capitalist society however demands personal engagement and creativity. Everyone is to a certain extent responsible to organize his or her life. It will take an unpredictable amount of time to change the people's mentality. The success of Capitalism depends on innovative individuals. Innovation however, was neglected for forty years.

The people in Eastern Europe got used to a certain personal materialistic security: a guaranteed job and a tight social net. This level of security is not provided by

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<sup>125</sup> see: Michael Roskin, 1991, p.180-185  
Janusz Ordover, 1991, p.27-28

Capitalism. It seems only logical that people have problems adjusting to this abrupt cognitive change. A life-time guarantee turned into the need for personal effort.

Therefore all of the three Eastern European countries are confronted with heavy worker resistance. When implementing measures which were initially designed to bring the economy on the path of free market, interest collisions were often unavoidable. Austerity measures, the liberation of prices or the privatization of former state-owned enterprises including massive lay-offs affected and threatened the individuals' materialistic security. Thus, worker unrest has limited the government's range of reform choices and policies.<sup>126</sup>

In Czechoslovakia in early 1991, labor unrest forced the federal administration to surrender its plan to quadruple the prices of electricity, gasoline and heating. Also, due to worker pressure in Slovak factories Czechoslovakia continues to produce military equipment, designed for the export to Third-World countries. Public pressure in Slovakia remained so strong that the federal government had to delay its plan and ideological commitment to gradually refrain from military exports.

Furthermore, resistance prevented agricultural decollectivization. In Poland, the Presidential election in late 1990 showed the dissatisfaction of the population with

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<sup>126</sup> see: Mark Kramer, 1992, p.145-146



the austerity measures of Tadeusz Masowiecki. It provided for a decisive victory for the populist Lech Walesa. In Hungary, the government abandoned its plan to cut agricultural subsidies after nationwide protests. Labor unrest created pressure on the government to loosen some austerity measures.

Sixth, the inherited economic system of Communism represents a brake block for the development of a capitalist system. Communism left an economic disaster behind.<sup>127</sup> Prices of goods were unrelated to costs and heavily subsidized. The inherited foreign debts taken over from the former regimes are striking (see table III.1). Industrial production, technology, agriculture and infrastructure had severe deficits compared to western standards and now has to be either reorganized or entirely substituted in order to gain a competitive position in the world market.

In Poland and Czechoslovakia, a "Mittelstand",<sup>128</sup> which represents the backbone of every market economy was simply missing. A slight relief exists in Hungary, for the country introduced modest market reforms in the early 1980's that gave permission for private economic activity for some small businesses to compete with products, manufactured by state-owned enterprises.

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<sup>127</sup> see: Janusz Ordover, 1991, p.25

<sup>128</sup> The German term refers to entrepreneurs with small or mid-size businesses.

A financial infrastructure, such as stock and bond markets and private commercial or investment banks was absent in communist economies. Finally, the management of state businesses simply lacked capitalist financial and management skills, disregarding consumers' needs or cost minimization. Economic activity was based on plan assessments. Fixed production quotas over a time span of five years had to be fulfilled, thus neglecting market or social influences or changing demands or market situations. The capitalist management skill to respond to reality was left undone, substituted by bureaucracy. To overcome this deficit, the post-communist governments tried to attract western expertise to work in Eastern Europe. But apart from metropolitan areas such as Prague or Budapest, foreign managers were confronted with housing which does not match western standards, a lack of cultural entertainment or a pre-war telephone network; in short an environment which demands a certain amount of idealism.

## 2. External Threats

A variety of external threats represent a challenge to the security and endanger the process of the establishment of a stable democracy. First, Poland and Germany signed a bilateral treaty in 1990, in which Germany recognized the western border of Poland. In 1991, a formal commitment to

friendship and cooperation has been reached.<sup>129</sup> But the region of Silesia remains a political issue. Among some Germans, the Polish part of Silesia is still seen as a legal part of the German nation with a German tradition and heritage. From a legal point of view the issue seemed to be settled. However, the strong ties of the German part of Silesia to its Polish counterpart still represent a source for possible tensions. In addition, tensions along the remaining borderline recently escalated into violent attacks against Polish visitors to eastern Germany. Right-extremists as well as average eastern German citizens blamed Poles for buying out their shops, while conflicts were further sharpened by ethnic tensions. Such incidents indicate that old issues and resentments are now emerging again. For forty years Communism imposed a forced friendship upon the two states of East Germany and Poland, a brotherhood along the "Peace Border". It was a fake, far from reality.

Second, the unpredictable situation in the republics of the former Soviet Union. Although an intentional aggression is hardly to be feared, Eastern Europe nevertheless has to raise concern about the political development in this region. According to Gerhard Wettig, "the momentum of belligerent action could lead to a spillover effect".<sup>130</sup> An

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<sup>129</sup> New York Times, 03 April, 1992

<sup>130</sup> Gerhard Wettig, 1992, p.233

armed conflict on former Soviet territory would involve further security risks, such as the use of ABC weapons, unsafe or irresponsible stored dangerous material, or nuclear weapons and their difficult protection against illegal appropriation. Additional threats are drug trafficking from Asia, organized crime and possible large-scale migrations due to mass poverty or war.<sup>131</sup>

In this context, the security of Poland is particularly endangered. According to a Soviet census in 1989, 1.12 million ethnic Poles <sup>132</sup> are living in parts of Belorussia, Ukraine and Lithuania, which belonged to Poland in the period preceding World War II. The potential of a rising Polish nationalism could increase the tension along the various borderlines.

Furthermore, the new republics Belorussia, Ukraine and Lithuania are themselves democracies in transition. Their democratization process is unstable as well. The political direction which these countries pursue seems to be democratic. However, the victory of the former Communist Algirdas Brazauskas in Lithuania indicates that the possibility of political unrest, turmoil and regime change should not be neglected. Also, Ukraine imposes an acute

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<sup>131</sup> see: Gerhard Wettig, 1992, p.233-234

<sup>132</sup> Daniel N.Nelson, 1991, p.142

problem. Even if the country gives up its nuclear weapons, it still possesses a powerful army of some 400,000 men.<sup>133</sup>

Third, Hungary and the Hungarian minorities in its bordering countries. With the treaty of Trianon in 1920, Hungary was forced to give up one-third of its pre-war territory to Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Austria. Today, more than four million Hungarians live in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania.<sup>134</sup> Due to these large minority groups in Eastern European nations, voices of Hungarian nationalism and even unification based on a common historical and cultural identity, as well as border tensions are likely in this region.

The most severe tension is represented in the case of Romania. Figures estimate that between 1.5 and 2.3 million Hungarians are living in the Rumanian territory of Transylvania.<sup>135</sup> The Hungarian minority claims that they have been denied economic and political rights. Furthermore, the political process towards democracy is making progress in Hungary, while it lags severely behind in Romania, which is more or less a new communist dictatorship in pseudo-democratic disguise.

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<sup>133</sup> Otto Pick, 1992, p.28

<sup>134</sup> New York Times, April 08, 1992, p.A12

<sup>135</sup> David Nelson, 1991, p.143

Also, the 600,000 Hungarians living in Slovakia are confronted with the uncertainty of the future of the Czech-Slovak Federal Republic. In an independent Slovak state, consisting of only 4.5 million people, the chances are likely that they will press for greater autonomy.

Fourth, the unstable situation in former Yugoslavia. With ethnic groups struggling for independence, the artificial construct of Yugoslavia imposes a further threat to the security of Eastern Europe. Serbian aggressiveness already has culminated into a spill over effect to foreign territory. Border violations resulted in the bombardment of the Hungarian border town Barcs in October 1991.<sup>136</sup> The civil war in former Yugoslavia caused a tide of refugees. The estimated figure in Bosnia alone amounts to 1.3 million, from which at least 700,000 have fled the country. Croatia as well as West European governments have resolved not to admit any more.<sup>137</sup> The uncertainty of the outcome of this conflict imposes a security threat to all Eastern European states. Control mechanisms to manage the civil war are so far not existent.

As these examples show, the entire region of Eastern Europe is confronted with numerous security threats, but is

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<sup>136</sup> see: Osteuropa, May 1992, p.A281

<sup>137</sup> see: New York Times, October 28, 1992, p.A8



lacking a reliable security structure. In fact, in the aftermath of the Cold War and with the destruction of the Warsaw Pact, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia are facing a security vacuum. "Europe's unstable East"<sup>138</sup> needs to implement a new security concept that is capable of counterbalancing a variety of internal and external threats, in order to prevent antidemocratic forces from challenging the new regimes.

## B. The Transition of Spain

### 1. Internal and External Threats

Spain was confronted with several internal threats. First, the role of the armed forces: as seen in II.C. the military represented a severe threat to the new democracy. The incorporation into the new system failed, for the Army was not offered a new ideological base - the role of a defender of democracy instead of the former positions as a security force for internal repression.

Second, political violence and terrorism, especially in the Basque country, challenged the new regime. This issue is closely related to regionalism and demands for regional autonomy in Spain. Comparable to the current situation in

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<sup>138</sup> David Nelson, 1991, p.137

Eastern Europe, regional and cultural diversification was suppressed over the years of authoritarian rule. After 1977, these demands abruptly emerged.

Third, the democratic governments of the UCD and the PSOE were confronted with unfavorable economic conditions. The task of adapting the industrial complex to competitive international standards happened during a worldwide economic downswing<sup>139</sup> including two major oil crises and resulted in high unemployment rates, which are still the highest among all OECD countries. In 1978, 8 per cent were out of job, while this figure increased to 22 per cent in 1986.<sup>140</sup>

The economic transformation of Spain into a market economy initially suffered from various problems, inherited by the Franco regime.<sup>141</sup> The technological standard was poor with low capital investment.<sup>142</sup> The economic modernization of the 1960's and the unprecedented growth

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<sup>139</sup> Edward Malefakis, 1986, p.229

<sup>140</sup> in: Europe Yearbook, Vol.I, 1980, p.1080  
Vol.II, 1986, p.2369

<sup>141</sup> GNP and Education in 1971 compared with other countries.

	France	Greece	Spain
GNP per head (in US\$):	3.180	1.120	1.070
% by sector:agriculture	6.0	19.5	13.5
industry	48.4	30.5	34.4
expenditure on education	4.5	2	2.2
(% of GNP)			

Source: OECD Economic Survey, 1973, p.65

<sup>142</sup> Edward Moxon-Browne, 1989, p.5

rates were based on the development of basic industries, such as shipbuilding and steel production and did not relate to the fundamental structural problems of the Spanish economy. Spain had traditionally been an agricultural country. Modernization however did not cover this sector.

The problems increased with the rise in oil prices after 1973 when suddenly shipbuilding and steel were confronted with higher production costs.<sup>143</sup> Due to Franco's reliance on a system of autarky, international trade relations had been neglected for decades.<sup>144</sup> Furthermore, after Franco's demise in 1975, labor costs increased and the economy largely depended on foreign investment, capital and technology. The initial economic problems put the new regime under a harsh test. The government was forced to put large sums of money aside to finance unemployment. Also, Madrid was confronted with severe inflation due to excessive wage levels and expenditures of the public sector. Also, the annual growth of the GDP, which averaged an impressive seven per cent between 1960 and 1973 dropped significantly (see also Table 2.).

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<sup>143</sup> Benny Pollack, 1987, p.141

<sup>144</sup> In 1973 imports totaled 561.543 million pesetas, compared to 4.177.034 million pesetas in 1983. The corresponding figures for exports are 302.670 and 2.846.749 million pesetas which represent an increase of 370 per cent (imports) and 470 per cent (export) over a period of 10 years. in: Europa Yearbook, Vol.I, 1978, p.1117  
Vol.II, 1986, p.2369

Table 2. Economic Data on Spain

in per cent:

<u>Inflation</u>	<u>GDP Growth rates</u>	<u>Unemployment</u>
1977: 28,0	1979: 0,8	1978: 8,0
1978: 16,5	1980: 1,7	1981: 11,6
1979: 15,0	1981: 0,4	1983: 17,0
1983: 12,2	1982: 1,2	1984: 20,0
1985: 8,1		1986: 22,0

sources:

Europa Yearbook, Vol.I, 1978, p.1108, Vol.I, 1980, p.1080  
Vol.I, 1981, p.1089, Vol.I, 1982, p.1076,  
Vol.I, 1983, p.1070, Vol.I, 1984, p. 775  
Vol.II, 1985, p. 802, Vol.II, 1986, p.2369

The socialist government of the PSOE responded to these problems in an unexpected way, almost using conservative measures. The PSOE made little attempt to create new jobs. According to Edward Moxon-Browne, unemployment is widely accepted in Spain among all Spanish parties, but it is acknowledged that nothing can directly be done about it.<sup>145/</sup> Instead, the Gonzales administration devaluated the Peso in its first year in power by 8 per cent,<sup>146/</sup> cut

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<sup>145/</sup> Edward Moxon-Browne, 1989, p.10

<sup>146/</sup> Europa Yearbook, Vol.I, 1978, p.2369

public expenditures and froze wages and gave priority to fighting inflation<sup>147/</sup> in order to establish an economic climate which would stimulate private investment and therefore create jobs. The PSOE intended to promote more technologically advanced industries, hoping to transform the economic structure of the country from a labor-intensive system into a capital-intensive system.<sup>148/</sup>

Several conditions favored the success of the Spanish transition. The support for democracy was already strong some years prior to Franco's demise. This positive attitude among the population provided for a "reservoir of good will"<sup>149/</sup> when the government was under economic pressure. Also, the international and regional environment favored the combination of a democratic regime and a capitalist economy, so that the process of integration into the international market could succeed.

Furthermore, tourism served as a booming sector within the economy.<sup>150/</sup> The number of tourists outnumbered the entire Spanish population as early as in 1972. This had a strong impact on Spanish life. Secularism and consumerism developed, a proper infrastructure was created, and the

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<sup>147/</sup> see: Edward Moxon-Browne, 1989, p.8-10

<sup>148/</sup> in: Benny Pollack, 1987, p.143

<sup>149/</sup> Edward Moxon-Browne, 1989, p.14

<sup>150/</sup> Edward Malefakis, 1986, p.218

tourist industry benefitted mainly small scale enterprises and helped create a "Mittelstand".

Most significantly, Spain early sought for an integration into the European community. On July 28, 1977, the UCD-government applied for full membership of the EC. The other parties in the Spanish parliament fully supported the government's decision. According to Benny Pollack,

"there was total agreement that no economically viable or politically suitable alternative to the European Community existed. It was accepted that...accession would be considered by the Spanish people as a display of international political support for the new democratic regime".<sup>151/</sup>

An incorporation into the Community was judged as a fostering factor to uplift the economy and as a security force for the success of reforming the political system into a democracy.

In terms of external threats Spain did not have to face a major problem. Although the country made its transition to democracy while the antagonism of the Cold War was still valid, the Spanish KP gradually lost public support. The threat of a possible communist infiltration connected with the strategic importance of the Iberian peninsula in the backyard of western Europe was at no times compelling.

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<sup>151/</sup> Benny Pollack, 1987, p.138



## 2. The New Spanish Security Policy

The main feature of the new Spanish security was the membership in NATO. After Franco the Alliance showed enthusiasm about a Spanish incorporation.<sup>152/</sup> But the skeptical Spanish public was opposed to join a military alliance where the United States was the commanding force. Spain showed little enthusiasm for American foreign policies in Latin-America.<sup>153/</sup> The U.S. had sustained the Franco regime with economic and military aid through an agreement, signed in 1953. In return, Franco gave the U.S. four military bases, over which they had virtually sovereign control. After Franco's death, these bases represented a political issue of great controversy.<sup>154/</sup> A strong neutralist stand existed in Spain that argued against Spanish involvement in Cold War alliances, while the American presence actually endangers the Spanish security. The military bases therefore did not only represent a reminder of the former Franco-U.S. cooperation, but further had the potential of drawing Spain into the pattern of the East-West conflict.

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<sup>152/</sup> Benny Pollack, 1987, p.152

<sup>153/</sup> Differences arose over El Salvador and Nicaragua. Prime Minister Gonzalez as vice president of the Socialist International and head of the Committee for the Defense of the Nicaraguan Revolution favored direct negotiations between the Salvadoran guerrillas and government, and opposed efforts to destabilize the Sandinista government.

<sup>154/</sup> see: Edward Moxon-Browne, 1989, p.86

The first Christian-Democratic government under Adolfo Suarez advocated NATO but was still hesitant, fearing a break of the general consensus on Spanish foreign policy. With the coup in February 1982, the necessity to integrate the military into society became evident. Suarez's successor, the Christian-Democrat Calvo Sotelo regarded NATO now as "conducive to the democratization of the armed forces".<sup>155/</sup> The Alliance should take the role of a vehicle to foster the modernization of the military and in providing the armed forces a new ideological base and a new place in society: defending the Spanish territory against outside aggression, as opposed to the former internal orientation.

In May 1982, Spain joined the Alliance, but a few months later, the parliamentary elections brought the Socialist government of Felipe Gonzales into power, who promised a referendum on the issue. Gonzales opposed a Spanish entry, regarding the strong public opposition against an integration in NATO. He argued that the entry into the Alliance would undermine the development of an autonomous foreign policy, that the dependence on the United States would increase. His fear was a vision of Spain drawn into the pattern of the East-West conflict.

However, after several months in power, Gonzales performed a U-turn on NATO. The government now put more emphasis on the strategic importance and the territorial

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<sup>155/</sup> Benny Pollack, 1987, p.156

security. Gonzales now stated that the bilateral agreement with the United States would not provide as much security as the Alliance. Furthermore, he approved Soleto's position, who stressed the modernizing factor of NATO. The problem for Gonzales was to convince his party and the public of his conversion. The delay of the referendum which was held in 1986 indicated his difficulties in doing so.<sup>156/</sup> Within these four years, the PSOE had to perform a balancing act. On one side, strong public resentments against NATO had to be eased. On the other side, Gonzales still had to support an integration into the Alliance, in order to show enthusiasm for European cooperation in the realm of the complicated accession negotiations for the EC.

While there was no formal connection between a Spanish membership in NATO and an accession into the EC, the two organizations are psychologically intertwined. As the former German Minister of State Alois Mertes stated in 1982,

"We cannot pretend a Spain which contributes ... to the defense of the West should be deprived of its economic benefits".<sup>157/</sup>

While NATO provides for the security of the continent, the EC provides economic benefits. Thus, if Spain would become a part of the security mechanism and therefore contribute to the defense of Europe, it would be hard for the EC to

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<sup>156/</sup> see: Edward Moxon-Browne, 1989, p.87

<sup>157/</sup> in: Eusebio Mujal-Leon, 1983, p.117

justify a refusal to give the country its economic benefits.<sup>158/</sup>

The compromise offered by Gonzalez was a restricted NATO- membership based on the French model, that is to say with no integration into military planning and with no nuclear weapons on Spanish territory.<sup>159/</sup> NATO membership was finally approved by 52 per cent of the electorate in February 1986.

The second keystone of the Spanish security was represented in a number of institutional arrangements to satisfy the claims for autonomy by the several regions. A section in the Constitution was devoted to the regions' autonomy. In Catalonia and in the Basque country separate regional governments existed as early as 1980, with their own regional institutions, giving respect to the regions' different languages and national identities. Furthermore, the central government fosters an economic autonomy. The Basque government has the right to levy taxes. While the tax rates are identical with the rest of Spain, only one-third

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<sup>158/</sup> In this context one might argue that the case of France shows that a membership in NATO is not an essential requirement for an accession to the EC. But although France is not a member in NATO, it nevertheless contributes significantly to the European security through its military bases in the south-western part of Germany.

<sup>159/</sup> in: Edward Moxon-Browne, 1989, p.87

of the taxes from the Basque country goes to Madrid.<sup>160/</sup> By 1983, the Madrid government had been granted a status of autonomy to seventeen regions, each with their own parliament, supreme court and civil service.

Third, in fighting terrorism, the Spanish government took a variety of actions. In terms of anti-terrorist legislation a state of siege could be declared by the parliament in the event of an insurrection or act of force against the sovereignty or independence of Spain, its territorial integrity or its institutional order. Constitutional rights could be temporarily suspended.<sup>161/</sup> In addition, Spain tried to make the security forces more effective in their fight against political violence. Furthermore, through cooperation with France the government hoped to eliminate the French territory as a base and refuge for ETA operations.<sup>162/</sup>

Fourth, the integration into the European Community accounted for an economic development which stabilized the formerly fragile economy.<sup>163/</sup> The Community realized that economic issues could not be separated from security

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<sup>160/</sup> Edward Moxon-Browne, 1989, p.56

<sup>161/</sup> Edward Moxon-Browne, 1989, p.58

<sup>162/</sup> see also chapter IV.A.2

<sup>163/</sup> see also chapter IV.A.2

aspects. In Dublin in September 1984, the ten Heads of States agreed that the Spanish accession was not merely an economic affair.<sup>164/</sup> The community, although basically an economic organization, has a strong impact on a nation's security. Apart from a prospering economy which secures a democratic transition the organization provides an arena for political cooperation and consultation among its members. Also, being incorporated into a community of democratic countries accounts for an additional feature of a security frame. In the era preceding World War II no democratic country in Europe had challenged the land border of its democratic neighbor.

### C. The Transition of Portugal

#### 1. Internal and External Threats

Besides the significant threat that the military imposed on the process of democratization,<sup>165/</sup> Portugal was confronted with an active and initially popular Communist party. The Portuguese Communist Party (CPP) was the "most hard-line, pro Soviet in Western Europe".<sup>166/</sup> Its leader, Alvaro Cunhal spent several years in exile in

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<sup>164/</sup> in: Benny Pollack, 1987, p.139

<sup>165/</sup> see chapter II.D

<sup>166/</sup> Robert Harvey, 1978, p.38



Czechoslovakia. He opposed the de-Stalinisation processes and identified with hardliners in the Kremlin. Tactical considerations on how to gain power determined his political behavior.

During the first months after the coup, the Soviet Union was impressed by Cunhal and his chances of gaining power and support among the public. This positive evaluation of a likely chance that communists could control the political scene was fostered by the composition of the various provisional governments. From September 1974 until November 1975 radical AFM officers and the Prime Minister Colonel Vasco Gonzales were affiliated with the communist party and largely directed the politics from the third to the fifth provisional government.<sup>167/</sup> Thus, the Soviet Union gave the CPP unqualified support while seeking their chances of establishing a communist-influenced government in the backyard of NATO. Ten million dollars per month were transferred from Moscow to the headquarters of the CPP.<sup>168/</sup>

The significance however of the communist party gradually decreased. Within the military, General Eanes and the forces committed to a democratic regime gained more and

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<sup>167/</sup> for further information on composition of the provisional governments and the political struggle for power in the aftermath of the coup see:  
Walter C. Opello, 1985, p.65-80

<sup>168/</sup> in: Robert Harvey, 1978, p.41

more control over the situation, culminating in the removal of Gonzales and other radical officers from positions of power in the fall of 1975. With Secretary of State Henry Kissinger regarding Portugal as a crucial sphere of interest, the Soviet Union heavily reduced its support.<sup>169/</sup>

Although access to governmental positions had been denied after 1976, public support for the Communist party and other left wing organizations remains considerable <sup>170/</sup> and the political left established itself as a political force in a Marxist tradition that regards the transformation of Portugal into a communist society as its utmost goal. But so far, the communist movement does not represent a cogent threat to the democratic system.

A third internal threat to the democratic transition is caused by an apathy in the Portuguese society towards the political process. The participation of significant parts of the population in the decision making process is lacking. The parties in Portugal remain "bureaucratic, hierarchical

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<sup>169/</sup> For a further discussion on the US-Soviet relation over Portugal see chapter IV.B.2

<sup>170/</sup> In the general elections of 1977 the CPP cast 14,35% of the votes. In later elections, the CPP formed a coalition together with other left-wing parties. The percentages: 1980: 19%, 1987: 12,14%, 1991: 8,8% in: Europa Yearbook, 1977, Vol.I, p.1048, 1980, Vol.I, p.1045 1988, Vol.II, p.2217, 1992, Vol.II, p.2280

and Lisbon oriented".<sup>171/</sup> The electoral law enacted in December 1974 divided the country into 24 local districts. The party-lists for each district are set up by the headquarters in the capital. Thus, the relationship between the voters and the candidate are abstract, for the elector chooses a party list and not an individual.<sup>172/</sup>

Also, the phenomenon of "personalismo" contributed to the attitude of apathy towards the political process. "Personalismo" can be defined as "the predominance of individual or personal interests and actions over collective or national interests and actions".<sup>173/</sup> The pursuing of self-centered interests, particularly on the bureaucratic level and among political parties over general interests is common in the Portuguese society and deeply based in cultural tradition.<sup>174/</sup>

As a result of "personalismo", a system of patronage overshadowed the formation of the first democratic governments. Although Portugal did not reach "Italian standards", of corruption and personal linkages, the various parties in government tried to create power bases by appointing government supporters to bureaucratic posts.<sup>175/</sup>

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<sup>171/</sup> Tom Gallagher, 1985, p.206

<sup>172/</sup> see: Tom Gallagher, 1985, p.206

<sup>173/</sup> Douglas Wheeler, 1983, p.342

<sup>174/</sup> see: Douglas Wheeler, 1983, pp.342

<sup>175/</sup> see: Tom Gallagher, 1985, p.209

In short, internal democracy and free expression was still lacking in the Portuguese party system and keep popular involvement on a low scale.

A further consequence of "personalismo" is the loyalty to persons or personalities rather than to institutions or ideas.<sup>176/</sup> This kind of uncritical devotion to one particular person has strong cultural roots. "Sebastianism" which can be described as "an atavistic, messianic form of popular nationalism"<sup>177/</sup>, traces back to the 16th century, when King Sebastian miraculously disappeared during an expedition. This belief, that a hero, a great man will appear to solve the national crisis is a widespread feeling among the population. The tendency to create personal cults has an impact on the contemporary Portuguese society. Annual masses for national heroes, such as King Carlos I (died in 1908) and President Sidonio Pais (assassinated in 1914) are still being held.

Although such myths are not uncommon in most countries, in Portugal they result in a growing "Salazar"- cult, referring to the country's dictator from 1932 to 1968 combined with a glorification of the achievements of his dictatorship.<sup>178/</sup> The impact of history, of kings, rulers

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<sup>176/</sup> see: Douglas Wheeler, 1983, p.342  
Tom Gallagher, 1985, p.209

<sup>177/</sup> Douglas Wheeler, 1983, p.343

<sup>178/</sup> see: Douglas Wheeler, 1983, p.364

or even dictators who brought a certain fame to the nation should not be neglected in the evaluation of the contemporary attitude among the Portuguese population towards their new system. It is this fame and glory which serves as the gauge for the performance of politicians and for the democracy in itself. As Douglas Wheeler noted, (Portugal is) "a country where historical memories have an ancient pedigree".<sup>179/</sup>

Despite high electoral turnouts between 78 and 92 per cent in the general elections between 1975 and 1980, the public remained skeptical towards the capability of democracy to solve the country's problems. In the post-revolutionary period, the new system was held responsible for a declining economy and for providing "a license for communist skulduggery".<sup>180/</sup>

Here Portugal faces a complex problem, grounded in 50 years of authoritarian rule. The dictatorship left people ill-equipped for democracy and political participation. Apathy towards the political process and a focus on the personal environment, on the family and the job were common habits in the Salazar regime. Non-participation was further fostered by the high rate of illiteracy (at least 25 per cent<sup>181/</sup>) and a lack of education. The alteration of these

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<sup>179/</sup> Douglas Wheeler, 1983, p.363

<sup>180/</sup> Douglas Wheeler, 1983, p.353

<sup>181/</sup> Douglas Wheeler, 1983, p.352

patterns of behavior, both on the individual level as well as in the realm of internal party democracy is a long-term process. The appreciation of democracy among the population, the participation of broad parts of the society in the political process so far still stands in opposition to traditional modes of behavior and attitudes.

These factors, combined or separated can generate a popular and broadly based rejection of democracy and can serve as a hotbed for populist movements and a return to authoritarian rule. The incorporation of the masses in the political process and a more critical mentality towards political elites need to be developed. Although almost twenty years have been passed since the implementation of a new political system, the preparation of the mass public for democracy is as yet incomplete. Only if Portugal is able to show that a democratic society has the capabilities to solve social and economic tensions, a responsive attitude can emerge where people realize that it "pays off" to participate in and to contribute to the democratic process. This will eventually transform into a gradual departure from political apathy.

As a fourth internal threat, the economic performance of Portugal hampered the democratic transition. As in the case of Spain, Portugal faced an unfavorable international economic climate in the initial period after the revolution.



Due to a worldwide recession, the capabilities to attract international investment and to reduce inflation were limited. With a limited range of products, Portuguese industry was not competitive abroad. Regarding the area of farm products for instance, only wine and tomatoes undersold European competitors.<sup>182/</sup>

In addition, having no natural resources, the country has to import all of its fuel needs.<sup>183/</sup> The impact of two years of revolutionary struggle between civilians and the army, between left and right and with provisional governments in various political shades were heavy. When the first freely elected government under Mario Soares came into power in 1976, Portugal's annual trade deficit amounted to two billion dollars, the budget deficit was one billion dollar and its foreign debt was over two billion dollars.<sup>184/</sup> From 1974 to 1976 Portugal had borrowed more than three billion dollars and used up one billion dollars of its foreign exchange reserves.<sup>185/</sup>

The industrial sector was a disaster. The nationalized industries were largely divided into two groups: the big monopolies and a number of small firms. The former were

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<sup>182/</sup> Economist, May 28, 1977, Survey p.20

<sup>183/</sup> see: Tom Gallagher, 1985, p.217

<sup>184/</sup> see: Robert Harvey, 1978, p.119

<sup>185/</sup> Economist, May 28, 1977, survey, p.22

basically concentrated in the shipbuilding and cement manufacture, two fields which provided for the economic boom in the 1960's. But with the worldwide recession these branches could not contribute to large foreign currency earnings which are vital for an economic recovery.<sup>186/</sup> The smaller companies also did not make much profit, either because of bad management during the two years of revolution, while they were managed by worker cooperatives or because they have been rescued by the state from bankruptcy.<sup>187/</sup>

As a result, the only chance for an investment revival lay in the private sector, for it was basically concentrated in areas where Portuguese products were still internationally competitive, such as canned food and textiles.<sup>188/</sup> This was precisely the ambivalence that the Portuguese economy had to face. An economic policy that fostered the private sector and gave benefits to domestic entrepreneurs and further attracted foreign investment contradicted major concerns of the governing socialist party, such as education or health care.

Thus, the revival of private investment and the involvement of international financial sources was slow and hesitating, due to the uncertainty over the Socialists'

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<sup>186/</sup> see: Robert Harvey, 1979, p.120

<sup>187/</sup> see: Robert Harvey, 1978, p.212

<sup>188/</sup> see: Robert Harvey, 1978, p.121

intention and policies. As a result of the revolution, the state controlled the entire banking sector. It lacked specialization and skill in credit management while the efficiency was lowered by bureaucratic procedures<sup>189/</sup> which were typical for the Portuguese society. In addition, banks suffered from a lack of confidence due to a labor action in 1975 that seized some banks while accounts were publicized and examined.

Unemployment added to the various economic problems. Under the dictatorship, there existed a high rate of underemployment, but a low rate of wholly unemployed. Wages were low, but most families occupied several jobs which provided for a fair living. After the revolution underemployment turned into heavy unemployment. Under the Salazar regime, unemployment had simply been exported to a booming Europe. Up to 1.5 million people went abroad and provided their families regular financial support. With a worldwide recession, most emigrants returned to Portugal, thus increasing the unemployment problem and decreasing the purchasing power due to a missing income. In addition, a total of about one million refugees from Angola and Mozambique had to be integrated into the economy.<sup>190/</sup> Half of them were under sixteen and were just about to enter or had recently entered the labor market.

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<sup>189/</sup> Economist, May 28, 1977, survey p.23

<sup>190/</sup> in: Robert Harvey, 1978, p.126

Table 3. Economic Data on Portugal

<u>unemployment</u>	<u>inflation</u>	<u>in per cent</u> -----
1975: 10,0	June 1976: 12,0	
1977: 16,0	June 1977: 36,0	
1978: 12,5	August 1978: 22,0	
1981: 7,6	June 1980: 16,6	
1984: 10,8	June 1984: 29,3	
1985: 11,0	June 1985: 19,3	

<u>Trade Balance:</u>	<u>Current Balance:</u>	<u>in million US\$</u> -----
1975: -1.670	- 817	
1977: -2.506	-1.499	
1981: -5.194	-2.850	
1983: -3.084	-1.686	
1985: -1.504	386	

<u>GDP at constant 1977 prices:</u>	<u>in million US\$</u> -----
1977: 5.6	
1979: 6.1	
1981: 1.3	
1983: -0.3	
1984: -1.6	
1985: 3.3	

average 1977-86: 2.9

sources:

Europa Yearbook, Vol.I, 1976, p.1015 Vol.I, 1977, p.1029  
 Vol.I, 1978, p.1045 Vol.I, 1979, p.1032  
 Vol.II, 1986, p.2164  
 OECD Economic Surveys, November 1976, p.22, July 1979, p.18  
 June 1984, p.36 1987/88, p.102

The conditions for an economic recovery were critical for the new democratic system (see also Table 3.). The

Soarez Government walked a thin line between the implementation of economic policies for recovery and social unrest caused by the high rates of unemployment and inflation as well as the soaring costs of living which more than doubled between 1975 and 1977.<sup>191/</sup> The Socialist government introduced a variety of austerity measures to reorganize the economy. In 1977, Portugal devaluated the Escudo by 15 per cent and established price controls on essential food items, import restrictions on luxury and non-essential goods, as well as tax incentives for exporters and incentives for private savings. Also, measures were taken to reduce public spending.<sup>192/</sup> In 1983, Soarez announced an eighteen-month emergency program which included a reduction of state subsidies and the opening of the banking and insurance sectors for private investment.<sup>193/</sup>

The ability of the democratic government to ease social tension and to offer prospects for an economic recovery determined the fate of the democratic system for the army was prepared to regain political control in case of a further deterioration of the economic and social conditions. Under the impact of such a severe economic malaise, it was not surprising that Portugal sought admission into the EC as

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<sup>191/</sup> Robert Harvey, 1978, p.131

<sup>192/</sup> Europa, Vol.I, 1978, p.1045

<sup>193/</sup> Europa, Vol.II, 1986, p.2164

early as March 1977. This step by Prime Minister Soares had the full support of all democratic parties.<sup>194/</sup>

As in the case of Spain, it was a generally accepted assumption that modernization of the industries and the desperately needed foreign investments could only be reached through an incorporation within the Community. The prospect of a membership within the EC was seen as vital for an economic recovery and thus for the stabilization of democracy.

As with its Iberian neighbor, Portugal did not face any severe external threats. Although excluded from the nuclear planning group of NATO in the first years after the coup of 1974, neither Portugal nor the other member states questioned the importance of its membership in the Alliance. The heavy financial support of the Soviet Union to the communist party did not further develop in any guerilla activity, terrorism or revolutionary attacks to the democratic regime. The incorporation into NATO with the strategic importance of Portugal for the Alliance prevented any outside intervention or aggression.

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<sup>194/</sup> see: Economist, May 28, 1977, survey p.29



## 2. The New Portuguese Security Policy

NATO represents the security-bedrock of the Portuguese Democracy. While Spain under Franco was confronted with political and economic isolation and unable to form ties with the western world, Portugal joined the Alliance in 1949 at its creation. In the 1960's the country turned its economy towards Europe, by becoming a founding member of the European Free Trade Association. Therefore, its linkages with the West were already established at the outbreak of the Revolution. Military cooperation within NATO represents a traditional cornerstone of the security of post-war Portugal, while the radical departure from colonialism in the mid 1970's further enhanced the western orientation of Portuguese politics.

From a geo-political point of view the separate entity of the Iberian region should suggest close cooperation with Spain. However, each of the two countries has its own separate identity and cooperation is almost absent in modern history, a situation which Bernardo Futscher Pereira described as "a long ingrained habit of turning their backs to each other".<sup>195/</sup> However, with two authoritarian regimes in power on the Iberian peninsula, the dictators Franco and Salazar formed a loose alliance of moral and ideological support. But with democracy on the rise, historical

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<sup>195/</sup> Bernardo Futscher Pereira, 1986, p.64

resentments and defiance emerged again. It was not until the common application to the EC that relations improved. Issues of trade and fishery which deadlocked negotiations for a further cooperation had to be clarified and settled in order to reach an accession.<sup>196/</sup> But the geopolitical position and an almost parallel transition to democratic rule did not further develop in a "special relationship" of cooperation.

The impetus of the EC in reducing the Spanish-Portuguese antagonism indicates the impact, which the Community has on Portuguese politics. The EC with its prospect for economic recovery, political stability, and security serves as the second cornerstone to the new Portuguese security concept.

The accession into the Community represented the third and final step to complete the "European connection". In the aftermath of the second World War, Portugal was a founding member of NATO and consequently began a process of opening towards Europe as well as towards North America. The membership in the European Free Trade Association in 1967 further enhanced this development. The decision to join the European Community represented the final departure from old colonial politics. The country used to be caught between two vises, that of Africa and that of Europe. The future however

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<sup>196/</sup> see: Bernardo Futscher Pereira, 1986, p.81-84

was seen by all major parties exclusively in the realm of western-European democracies.<sup>197/</sup>

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<sup>197/</sup> Robert Harvey, 1978, p.74

CHAPTER IV  
THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE POWERS

A. The Case of Spain

1. The incorporation of the Military Apparatus

With the incorporation into the North Atlantic Alliance, the internal threat of the military apparatus ceased. In addition, Spain and France entered into a comprehensive military agreement in November 1983, covering joint areas production, training and the sharing of facilities for ships, aircraft and transport. At the end of the Hispano-French seminar in Leon in October 1988, the two Foreign ministers agreed on a further coordination of external action in Latin America, the Middle East and Eastern Europe.<sup>198/</sup> Furthermore, West Germany and Spain established working groups on multilateral security activities. All these actions helped integrating the Spanish military into the international community and provided the Armed Forces with a new task and ideological base.

The democratic transition changed the Spanish-American relation. Neither country needed the other as much as in 1953 when the United States financially supported the Franco regime in order to have the strategic advantage of military bases on the peninsula. Relations were further clouded by a

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<sup>198/</sup> see: Bruce George and Mark Stenhouse, 1991, p.105

strong anti-Americanism among the population, expressed by Jose Antonio Soler, host of the popular TV-show "Buenos Dias":

"We had no American troops liberating us and no Marshall Plan. All we saw was Eisenhower embracing Franco".<sup>199/</sup>

In the aftermath of the coup in 1982, while European leaders denounced the terrorist attack on the Spanish parliament, Secretary of State Alexander Haig seemed to shrug off the putsch with the remark that it was a Spanish internal matter. Although Haig has not been briefed about the incident when the press caught him, it further increased the negative attitude towards the U.S. The rumor that the CIA knew about the coup was taken for granted by many Spaniards.<sup>200/</sup>

The distrust of the U.S. among the Spanish people traces back to the Spanish-American war in 1898 which essentially resulted in the loss of the Spanish status as a significant European power. In a poll taken in May 1985, 64 per cent of the respondents said they do not regard the United States as a true friend of Spain. 74 percent felt that American arms policy is a danger to peace.<sup>201/</sup> The

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<sup>199/</sup> in: U.S. News and World Report: 24 March 1986, p.30

<sup>200/</sup> see: Ray Alan: "The U.S. and the Coup in Spain"  
in: New Leader, April 20, 1981, p.11

<sup>201/</sup> in: Adrian Shubert, 1985, p.672

core of the problem were the four American air bases. While access to the bases played a major role in American considerations, Spain remained skeptical towards a foreign power on its territory. The base agreement was regarded as a left over from the Franco regime.<sup>202/</sup>

Finally in 1988, the two nations agreed to deploy the 72 F-16 bombers by 1991. Spain was willing to pay 50 percent of the costs of approximately one billion dollars, while it also bought 73 F-18 bombers from the United States to improve its defense and to account for the loss in the NATO defense structure.<sup>203/</sup> With the American forces leaving Spanish ground, the emphasis in the post-Franco era was now the security of U.S. investments and the preservation of democratic institutions. The Spanish orientation shifted from America to Europe.

Still, the United States played a helping role in providing a proper Spanish security. Apart from the enthusiasm towards Spanish membership in NATO, the U.S. gave heavy financial assistance to reorganize the Spanish

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<sup>202/</sup> Economist: January 23, 1988, p.41

<sup>203/</sup> Time, January 25, 1988, p.47



military.<sup>204/</sup> This process helped Spain achieve the technological standards required by NATO.

## 2. Internal Threats

A closer cooperation with France was necessary in order to gain control over Spain's major terrorist problem ETA. For logistical reasons, France had been a traditional operational base for ETA. The Basque provinces of Spain are separated from France by the Pyrenees. ETA often used the inaccessible territory to carry out terrorist attacks and retreated across the border into France. ETA's struggle against the Franco regime encouraged French tolerance but as terrorism endangered the Spanish democratic system, Paris began to collaborate with Madrid. The two countries reached a bilateral accord in 1983 with increasing police and judicial action.<sup>205/</sup> Although terrorism continues to

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204/ The following figures are according to "AID" (Agency for International Development):  
in 1976 the U.S. provided no loans but \$ 0.8 million in grants: 0.6 for Military education and training  
0.2 for Military Assistance Program  
in 1977-8: \$ 120 million loans, (credit financing)  
\$ 17 million grants:  
\$ 15 million Mil. Assistance Program  
\$ 2 million Mil educ. and training  
in 1979: \$ 120 million loans (credit financing)  
\$ 44.4 million grants:  
\$ 42.4 million Mil.Ass.Program  
\$ 2 million Mil educ. and training

205/ see: Bruce George and Mark Stenhouse, 1991, p.106-108

represent a threat to the Spanish security, the support of France is essential in handling this issue.

The Spanish fight against political violence further benefitted from the integration into Europe. Spain participates in the Trevi Group, which consists of the Interior and Justice Ministers and the police chiefs of the twelve EC countries. The Group is designed to coordinate cooperation among police and intelligence agencies.<sup>206/</sup>

Foremost, admission into the European Community gave Spain the opportunity of economic development, thus stabilizing social peace and providing an arena for political cooperation and consultation. A closer look at the Spanish industrial output underlines the positive impact of the EC for the Spanish economic recovery. The GNP per head rose over 250 per cent from 3,520 US\$ per head (in real terms) in 1976 to 9,150 US\$ in 1989.<sup>207/</sup>

Unemployment however continued to be a serious problem. It has grown inexorably from eight per cent in 1978 to 22 per cent in 1986, while the figure of 1991 was 15 per cent. Government policies could not cure this Spanish disease, which arose due to the restructuring of the heavily overstaffed industries of the Franco-era, in order to gain a competitive position on the world market.

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<sup>206/</sup> see: Bruce George and Mark Stenhouse, 1991, p.106

<sup>207/</sup> Europa, Vol.II, 1991, p.2408

In 1977 Spain applied for membership within the European Community. With the restoration of democracy, the country fulfilled a fundamental prerequisite and the European Parliament gave support for an accession.<sup>208/</sup> But the negotiations which started in 1979 stretched out over a period of six years. The difficulties here were based on economic factors. This was particularly disappointing to Spain. Especially in the early 1980's, with a number of coup attempts endangering the democracy, the country's hope for a quicker incorporation which would have provided an extra security was in vain.

The basic problem was the period of adaptation for the Spanish economy. Spain favored a short amount of time for its competitive agricultural products, while demanding a longer period to adjust own protective tariffs for the weak domestic industrial sectors. Other problems were fishing, the free movement of labor and financial and budgetary matters. Especially France -a competitor with Spanish agricultural products- blocked the negotiations and virtually deadlocked them between 1980 and 1981.<sup>209/</sup>

It was a political dimension that brought the negotiations back on track. When the election of 1982 placed the Spanish Socialist party PSOE in power, the country quickly began to question its NATO membership which it

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<sup>208/</sup> see: Benny Pollack, 1987, p.138

<sup>209/</sup> see: Benny Pollack, 1987, p.139

joined under the Christian Democratic government of the UCD in 1981.<sup>210/</sup> This debate was a major political issue that intensified after the PSOE declared its 180-degree-turnaround-policy which was now in favor of the Alliance. In September 1984 the ten Foreign Ministers of the European Community met in Dublin for an extraordinary meeting. With the 30th congress of the PSOE just three months ahead, the Community was aware that further delays in the negotiations might affect the current supporting attitude of the PSOE towards NATO. Suddenly the Community added a political dimension to the economic integration of Spain into Europe. In Dublin, the Foreign Ministers agreed on the basis for the accession<sup>211/</sup> and nine months later in June 1985 the treaty was signed.

By that time, Europe had gained outstanding economic importance for Spain.<sup>212/</sup> From Franco's death in 1975 until

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<sup>210/</sup> see chapter III.B.2

<sup>211/</sup> see: Benny Pollack, 1987, p.140

<sup>212/</sup> Spanish Foreign Trade in % of Total

	Imports		Exports	
	1975	1985	1975	1985
USA	15.8	10.9	10.5	9.9
West-Germany	10.3	10.6	10.7	9.6
France	8.3	9.3	13.7	15.5
Great Britain	5.3	10.9	7.6	8.6
Italy	5.2	4.6	3.4	7.0
Netherlands	2.7	3.8	4.9	8.0

sources: Europa Yearbook, 1976, Vol.I, p.1101  
1986, Vol.II, p.2428

the accession a decade later trade relations had steadily increased. In 1983 half of the Spanish exports went to Europe, a nominal increase of 670 per cent compared to 1975.<sup>213/</sup> In addition, 64 per cent of imported capital goods originated in the community, with France (25.7 per cent of all Spanish imports) and West Germany (29.6 per cent) providing for the major trading partners. Furthermore, the EC and its member states replaced the United States in terms of a source of foreign investment for Spain. In 1975 the U.S. accounted for 40.6 and the EC for 35.6 per cent, while in 1983 the figures were 11.7 and 51 per cent.

In 1985 Spain was in fact already economically incorporated in Europe. Only the institutional base of a full membership was missing. The path that the country has chosen was already irreversible: from an autarky to a modern market economy embedded in the European Community. But still, the long process of accession left the country open to disturbances. The number of coups and a stumbling economy endangered the stabilization of democracy.

In 1985, the EC supplied Spain with a pre-accession grant of 550 Million ECU.<sup>214/</sup> Considering the variety of economic problems and political turmoil this amount might seem limited. But in nominal terms it represented a

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<sup>213/</sup> in: Benny Pollack, 1987, p.140

<sup>214/</sup> in: Europe Yearbook, Vol.II, 1986, p.2369

significant portion of the EC budget and clearly indicated the Community's commitment to help Spain reorganizing and restructuring its economy. Still, the process of accession dragged over a period of nine years until the European vocation of the democratic-modernizers had been realized and Spain, together with Portugal joined the Community on 1 January 1986.

During the era of General Franco the United States was the main financial supporter of the regime. The mutual agreement between the two states in this period can be described as "money for strategy". With the democratic transition the relation was reduced to a united determination against a communist threat.

After Franco's death the U.S. had a concern for the security of U.S. investments. Also, in order to avoid a strategic security gap, the establishment of stable democratic institutions and the continuing access to its military bases in Spain was in the American interest.<sup>215/</sup> These concerns however, did not result in a significant economic assistance. In the period before Franco's demise, the United States granted Spain three million dollars annually.<sup>216/</sup> In the insecure and in retrospect

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<sup>215/</sup> Richard Rubottom and J.Carter Murphy, 1984, p.152

<sup>216/</sup> Figures according to "AID" (Agency for International Development), Washington D.C.



unpredictable year of 1976, financial support stopped. In 1977 however, grants of US\$ ten million and from 1978 to 1980 US\$ seven million annually of economic assistance were given to Spain. Still, the figures indicate, that the United States preferred to hand over the responsibility to Europe.

Europe more and more replaced the United States. The increasing trade relations and the process of a political and economic incorporation into the European Community had no comparable American counterweight, resulting in the stabilization of trade relations on a lower level.<sup>217/</sup>

The Spanish-American connection after World War II can also be described as "a matter of security and expediency, not an alliance".<sup>218/</sup> The character of this relation was still valid after Franco's death. The United States' strategic and security concerns were eased through an extension of the 1976 base-agreement and eventually with the integration of Spain into NATO - a political step that was heavily fostered by the U.S.<sup>219/</sup> The integration process into the European Community provided for the establishment of a democratic system, which secured U.S. investments and

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<sup>217/</sup> In 1973 Spain exported 13.8% of its goods to the U.S. In 1983 the figure dropped to 7.3%. Imports also decreased from 16% in 1973 to 11.9% a decade later.  
in: Europe Yearbook, Vol.I, 1978, p.1117  
Vol.II, 1986, p.2369

<sup>218/</sup> Richard Rubottom and J.Carter Murphy, 1984, p.135

<sup>219/</sup> see chapter III.B.2

further safeguarded strategic concerns in the age of the Cold War. In addition, an EC membership accounted for the implementation of a market economy which offered investment opportunities. Thus, the vital interests of the United States in Spain were secured by Europe. There was no need for a distinctive financial engagement.

Additional financial commitments from the United States were further hampered by the critical bilateral relationship. The quarrels over base negotiations and diverging opinion on Latin American issues, such as the Falklands War and U.S. policies on Nicaragua and El Salvador weakened the former strong ties.

In short, the Spanish transition was appreciated, but an active engagement and a fostering of a positive economic climate was hardly supported - a continuation of the expedient relation.

## B. The Case of Portugal

### 1. The Incorporation of the Military Apparatus

In reducing the internal threat which the military imposed on the establishment of a democratic regime, outside powers took a variety of actions. In early 1975, with the background of an unstable political situation and with communists possessing posts of political power, Portugal was

excluded from NATO's nuclear planning group which had access to highly classified material. But the actual membership of Portugal in the Alliance was never questioned. The United States had an air base at Lajes in the Azores as well as an underwater terminal to monitor Soviet submarine movements. Thus, Portugal was of vital strategical importance for NATO. The state of a partial exclusion from NATO organs was only temporary. A return to an entire incorporation followed with the emergence of a reliable democratic regime.

NATO helped Portugal and in particular President Eanes in their efforts to promote a new ideological base for the armed forces. As opposed to the colonial imperial past with a heavy military involvement in Africa, the emphasis was now on the defense of western Europe and the securing of the democratic regime. In order to pursue this new function, the military needed to be modernized. After the political situation was settled the West gradually began to update the technical equipment of Portugal and to provide military training.

Again, the leading role in Europe was played by the Federal Republic of Germany. With the Social Democratic party (SPD) in power, West Germany accounted for an arms transfers of US\$ 100 million between 1976 and 1980. While the U.S. also contributed to the modernization, the role of

France and Great Britain was only minor.<sup>220/</sup> In addition, the United States provided a military assistance of US\$ 33.5 million in 1977 and US\$ 27.9 million in 1978<sup>221/</sup>.

## 2. Internal Threats

The performance of the Portuguese communist party created fears among western nations, that the country might fall under communist influence, further fostered by the heavy financial support of the Soviet Union. The responses to this threat to democracy were as follows.

The United States reacted moderately towards the changes in Portugal. U.S. military bases and diplomatic posts were never in danger. While in the case of Chile the country rushed into helping right-wing soldiers to perform a putsch that would almost certainly have taken place without any U.S. interference, the Nixon administration was more cautious in Portugal. With no clear threat to NATO or the

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<sup>220/</sup> Between 1976 and 1980 France and Great Britian each provided US\$ 5 million.  
Source: World Military and Arms Transfers, 1983, p.118

<sup>221/</sup> The following figures are according to "AID" (Agency for International Development)  
in 1977 the U.S. provided \$ 33.5 million in grants  
    \$ 32.3 million: Military Assistance Program  
    \$ 1.2 million: Military Education and Training  
in 1978: \$ 27.9 million in grants  
    \$ 25.0 million: Military Assistance Program  
    2.9 million: Military Education and Training

U.S., Nixon and Kissinger relied on a policy, that would allow the democratic forces in the military as well as in other political parties to expose and counterweight the communist attempts to seize power. Only at the peak of the struggle for power in the "Hot Summer" of 1975 did the United States respond to the Soviet aid by ensuring its support for an evolving democracy. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger strengthened the ties with a democratic Portugal and explicitly warned the Soviet Union:

"Russia should not assume it has the option, either directly or indirectly, to influence events contrary to the right of the Portuguese people to determine their own future. The involvement of external pressures for this purpose in a country which is an old friend and ally of ours is inconsistent with any principle of European security".<sup>222/</sup>

With the prospect that the United States would not accept any further involvement of the Soviet Union in Portuguese affairs, Moscow reduced its support. For a short time, an internal threat of a probable communist influence in Portugal was transferred in the realm of the antagonism of the cold war. Some reports suggest, that during this time, a power struggle took place in the Kremlin with one faction around KGB chief Alexander Shelepin being in favor of an intensified involvement, whereas Brezhnev, following the

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<sup>222/</sup> in: Robert Harvey, 1978, p.76

policy of "detente", feared that the situation might get out of hand.<sup>223/</sup>

Kissinger's strict response and his affirmation of supporting democratic principles might have saved Portugal from emerging as a conflict zone in the struggle of the two ambivalent military systems. The firm standpoint of the U.S. prevented the internal threat of communist participation in Portuguese politics from developing into an external threat with international involvement. As long as ideological implications remained in the realm of domestic politics in Portugal, the involvement of the United States was low. But as soon as ideology entered the sphere of an international confrontation in the age of the cold war, the U.S. response left no doubt about its sphere of influence.

Not only the CPP, but also other political parties managed to form linkages to foreign political parties. Immediately after the coup of April 1974, every party in Portugal attempted to set up grass roots organizations for the upcoming bid for political power. Thus, the financial support of political parties from western European countries to their sister-organizations in Portugal served as a counter weight to the extensive financial support of the Soviet Union to the CPP.

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<sup>223/</sup> see: Robert Harvey, 1978, p.76



The West-German Social Democratic Party (SPD) took an especially active role, a position which was inconceivable for the Federal Republic a few years before. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and party chairman Willy Brandt were closely associated with the chairman of the Portuguese Socialists Mario Soares through the Socialist International. Despite the provision of several million dollars, advice and logistical support from the SPD, Schmidt managed to persuade the United States that Soares and the Socialists were the most reliable democratic force in Portugal and therefore ensured U.S. assistance as well.<sup>224/</sup>

The Associated Press reported on 25 September 1975 that since June the CIA transferred between two and ten million dollars per month to Soares' party.<sup>225/</sup> Furthermore, minor contributions to the Portuguese Socialists were given by the Socialist parties of France and Italy and the Labor Party in Great Britain.<sup>226/</sup> As far as other political movements are concerned, the Center Democrats created ties with the British Conservatives and the French Giscardians. The Popular Democrats failed to attract attention from any European Socialist movement and thus decided to refuse any European connection at all.

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<sup>224/</sup> see: Robert Harvey, 1978, p.73

<sup>225/</sup> in: Kenneth Maxwell, 1982, p.240

<sup>226/</sup> in: Robert Harvey, 1978, p.41

But no other organization could compete with the support given by the various Socialists parties and in particular the SPD. The German Social Democrats contributed to a large extent to the manifestation of democracy and the establishment of a viable Portuguese democratic force with a broad public base and support. The internal threat of Communism and the initial financial advantage of the CPP in establishing a party organization was reduced and eventually extinguished through the fostering of democratic alternatives.

In 1972 Portugal signed a Free-Trade-Agreement for industrial products with the European Community. To the agreement, tariff reductions concerning Portuguese agricultural exports were annexed. The document was enlarged in 1976 by making provision for dismantling trade barriers for exports from the EC to Portugal and covering new areas such as technology, financial aid and the positions of migrant workers.<sup>227/</sup> Thus, in 1972, prior to the Revolution and furthermore in 1976 Portugal created strong ties to Europe.

In addition, Great Britain joined the common market in 1972. The United Kingdom was Portugal's most important foreign market and both countries had been among the states establishing the European Free Trade Association in 1960.

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<sup>227/</sup> in: Paulo de Pitta e Cunha, 1983, p.321

With its most important trading partner now incorporated into the EC, it was vital for Portugal to further strengthen its trade relation with the Community. It was therefore a logical step of the First Provisional Government to ask the Community for economic support shortly after the coup in April 1974.

In November 1974, the Third Provisional Government presented a proposal for a renewal of trade terms under the Free-Trade-Arrangement. The position of the EC towards these proposals was reluctant. The regime crises in Portugal in the aftermath of the first coup which culminated in another military coup in March 1975 did not indicate the commitment to democracy necessary for financial support of the EC. By that time, the economic situation in Portugal worsened.<sup>228/</sup>

During Portugal's "Hot Summer" of 1975 the European Community still followed its reluctant policy concerning financial support. France vetoed a community loan in July 1975 for fear of subsidizing a socialist-communist alliance. The EC Council of the Heads of State and Government stated that it could only support a pluralist democracy,<sup>229/</sup> thus denying financial assistance. Although the EC Commission had proposed immediate economic aid to Portugal<sup>230/</sup> in June

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<sup>228/</sup> see chapter III.C.1

<sup>229/</sup> Rainer Eisfeld, 1986, p.31

<sup>230/</sup> see: Rainer Eisfeld, 1986, p.31

1975 it took another four months until the Community finally agreed to grant Portugal a US\$ 180 million grant from the European Investment Bank. By that time, a new social-democratic government had been in power for three weeks.

Here, the European Community sent a clear signal, connecting economic issues to political concerns. Economic aid was not granted without a commitment to democratic values and the development of democratic institutions which forced President Gomes to describe the EC attitude as "imical".<sup>231/</sup> With moderate Socialists having taken control within the AFM and a new provisional government in power since November 1975 western nations were more willing to support the Portuguese economy.

Thus, in February 1976 West Germany offered credits of US\$ 250 million, Switzerland and Norway US\$ 50 million and US\$ 18 million.<sup>232/</sup> Economic assistance further increased after the first free elections in the summer of 1976. The more it became obvious that the impact of radicals within the political process was constantly limited, the more were foreign powers willing to support Portugal's economic recovery and therefore its political consolidation. The United States gave US\$ 300 million in credits in February

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<sup>231/</sup> Rainer Eisfeld, 1986, p.32

<sup>232/</sup> Lester A. Sobel, 1976, p.137.

1977 and the U.S. and West Germany put together another US\$ 700 million four months later.<sup>233/</sup>

In March 1977, one year after the new Constitution had been promulgated, Portugal applied for membership in the European Community. In contrast to the first period of negotiations with Spain, the EC stressed the political importance of consolidating democracy in Portugal. The difference lay in Portugal's membership in NATO. Besides the economic issue, strategy was at stake. A political stabilization at the southern flank of the Alliance was vital for western security. Thus, strategic and security considerations were almost "automatically invoked in arguments about EC policies".<sup>234/</sup>

The process of a full integration however, was not to be completed until 1986. As in the case of Spain, economic problems over tariffs and competitive products had to be solved. Also comparable with its Iberian neighbor was the Community's financial support. The EC showed a distinctive commitment to integrate Portugal. The accession negotiations accounted for the provision of a grant of 700 million ECU, paid over a period of ten years following 1986, in order to modernize Portuguese agriculture.<sup>235/</sup>

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<sup>233/</sup> Robert Harvey, 1978, p.126

<sup>234/</sup> Rainer Eisfeld, 1986, p.34

<sup>235/</sup> see: Europa, Vol.II, 1986, p.2164

Portugal benefited from the incorporation into the Community. Since 1986, the country's GNP has grown at an annual rate of 4.3 per cent. The unemployment rate of four per cent is the lowest in the EC. This was due in part of the helping hand of the EC in restructuring the industrial and agrarian sectors. But also, the economic policies of the new government of Cavaco Silva, which took office in late 1985, fostered this positive tendency. Silva is committed to an increasing role of private enterprises and to reducing the levels of unemployment and inflation. Portugal emerged as an attractive haven for foreign investment due to its "low cost and ultra-productive labor force"<sup>236/</sup>. Portugal took advantage of the free flow of capital and the reduction of trade barriers, conditions made possible with EC integration.

Similar to their policies in Spain, the United States regarded Europe as the main responsible actor in the process of stabilizing the democratic regime in Portugal. But furthermore, the U.S. regarded Portugal in terms of the East-West ambivalence and felt very sensitive to eventual communist influence in the post-authoritarian regimes. Thus, economic assistance was heavy after it became obvious that Portugal was following a model of western-type democracies.

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<sup>236/</sup> in: Forbes Magazine, April 27, 1992, p.118



Similar to the Community, the United States connected financial aid to political commitment. In 1974 no economic assistance at all was given to Portugal. The figures steadily increased from US\$ 15 million in 1975 (US\$ 14.3 million in loans) to US\$ 338 million in 1978 (only loans).<sup>237/</sup> It was a clear policy by the United States: to foster the economy of a democratic Portugal and thus to stabilize the democratic transformation in order to secure the Southern European flank of the western security system.

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<sup>237/</sup> The figures are according to "AID" (Agency for International Development)

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION: OPTIONS FOR EASTERN EUROPE

What remains to be done by outside powers to provide Eastern Europe with a proper security? As seen in the previous chapters, the examples of the transition period of Spain and Portugal show important similarities to the current situation in Eastern Europe, which can be employed as a useful background in the search for the establishment of stable democratic systems.

#### A. Incorporating the Military

##### Apparatus into Society

The status of the civil-military relations in Eastern Europe shows remarkable similarities between the three countries. In Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, constitutional arrangements provide for a solid civil supremacy. The armed forces are given an autonomous realm in strictly military matters, such as training and recruitment in order to maintain their combat capabilities. The newly established military academies, responsible for education and training of future officers, are under military supervision. Each country took measures to eliminate the communist impact on the apparatus and all three countries

based their new military doctrine on the defense of the nation.

In addition, Eastern Europe reduced its armies. The reductions seemed useful, for the defensive orientation of the new military doctrine as well as the absence of an ideological enemy makes large armies obsolete. Within the stringent economic situation, it further relieves the states' budgets. Also, a reduction in size decreases the essential costs necessary for the provision of a decent material standard for the individual soldier.

In comparison, the two Iberian nations responded similarly to possible internal military threats. Both Spain and Portugal undertook severe reductions in force. They also tried to eliminate certain political-ideological influences on the army. In the case of Spain, former Franco officers were ousted. In Portugal, radical officers had to leave the forces.

In addition, the promulgation of new constitutions enhanced civil supremacy with the special case of Portugal, where the military has a traditional tendency to interact in politics. General Eanes, although a pro-democratic officer, symbolized the involvement of the military by holding the powerful position of the President until 1986.

But the essential malfunction in the civil-military relations in Eastern Europe is in the cognitive aspect, the need to make the armed forces feel integrated within the new

society. In terms of a new military doctrine all three countries emphasize the defending of the nation. In the case of Poland the military also stresses the long military tradition mixed with a certain amount of national pride. But the military in all of Eastern Europe is confronted with a skeptical population. The public attitude towards the army is shaped by forty years of communism, in which the military -although curtailed- never challenged the regimes and was reduced to a political actor of minimal influence. This lack in public support represents a cognitive deficit in the identities of the Eastern European militaries. As yet they do not feel integrated and respected as a vital element of a democratic system. This perception has the potency to transform into an alienation of the apparatus from society, which can generate into an internal challenge and threat to the democratic system.

The Iberian cases serve as useful comparisons. Spain gives a rich example on how to integrate the armed forces and on how to provide them with a new ideological base. The Spanish armed forces were largely segregated from the democratization process in society. It kept its old traditions and values and was not able to adapt to the rapid cultural and political transformation. But NATO served as a partial solution. The army was incorporated into an institution that provided a bedrock for the military doctrine -the defense of the country within the realm of

western nations. Furthermore, this newly found identity distracted the military from an involvement in internal political matters.

As mentioned above, the military in Portugal has a historical role for political intervention, while the Presidency has supreme authority and is traditionally open to a military officer. Nevertheless, NATO at least served as a buffer, as an additional arena, where the military found an identity and ideological base in contributing to the security of the western world.

The situation in Eastern Europe is similar. First, the prospect of alienated armies is apparent and second, the transformation into an open and democratic society has the tendency to contradict traditional values and attitudes of the conservative military mind.<sup>238/</sup>

The integration of the armies of Eastern Europe into a broader military concept can have the same effect as compared to the case of the Spanish armed forces. It became an integral part of the democratic system -as a servant and not as a threat. The question is whether NATO can provide the same identity to Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, as it did to the Iberian nations.

An entire incorporation into the Alliance would serve the purpose of an external orientation of the military in

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<sup>238/</sup> for a discussion on the military mind and ethic see:  
Samuel Huntington, 1959, 59-65  
Amos Perlmutter, 1977, p.25-40

the realm of western democracies. But several aspects prevent a complete adaptation of the Iberian experiences. First, an entire incorporation would leave the democratization processes of Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union isolated. This step would represent a setback for these nations and an exclusion from the integration process of Europe, a double-edged policy with two different standards.

Second, with full integration, NATO and Eastern Europe would be confronted with additional financial costs due to an adaptation to NATO-standards in terms of equipment and training and the logistical costs to fulfill specific tasks in the Alliance.

Third, although the possibility of alienated armies in Eastern Europe should be taken seriously, the current situation gives no indications of a counterrevolution or a coup, further enhanced by the guarantee of civil supremacy in terms of institutional and constitutional arrangements.

Portugal and Spain provided a cognitive base in an abrupt way through the help of NATO. The Alliance represented an ideological transmitter for the Iberian nations. The urge to integrate the Spanish military was pressing after various coups. In Portugal, the armed forces played a key role during the revolution and needed to be distracted from internal politics to give way to democratic institutions. From the early beginnings of the transition to



democracy, the lack of cognitive bases for the militaries in both countries represented a threat.

But the situation in Eastern Europe is different. The militaries so far have not demanded or attempted an involvement in internal politics. Moreover, they do not exert a significant influence on the democratization processes. Thus, the formation of an identity for the Eastern European militaries is not as urgent as it was in the cases of the Iberian nations. Therefore, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia do not necessarily need a military organization to offer a cognitive base for their armed forces. The mutual adaptation of the civil and military sectors of society can be given the necessary time in order to establish the mutual perception that both sectors are vital for a secure democracy.

Still, the sole function of defending the country bears the danger of an orientation towards internal matters. The militaries of Eastern Europe are in need of an international outlook and connection, which is related to their security function of safeguarding their nations. Here, outside powers can provide assistance. International cooperation within the realm of democratic societies would distract from internal political matters. It would provide for an exchange with armies from established democratic societies and would therefore give the theoretical ideology of defending the nation a practical notion. Mutual exchanges in the field of

military education and training, participation in maneuvers, technological assistance are among such measures. The provision of a new cognitive base is achieved through an integration within the western world. In the cases of Spain and Portugal, NATO served this purpose. But in Eastern Europe, cooperation, assistance, and advice are capable of fulfilling this function.

As argued in chapter II, the military needs to be professional to fulfill its security function. Thus, the technological standard of the Eastern European armies has to be upgraded in order to be effective. In the context of bilateral cooperation, outside powers should recall the assistance given to Portugal and Spain. The Carter and Reagan administrations helped the young democracies in bringing the military equipment on a higher standard and further financed military-educational training. France entered into a bilateral military agreement with Spain, while Germany established working groups with Spain and gave financial assistance for the modernization of the Portuguese military.

One might say that these measures by western powers were designed to increase the effectiveness of NATO in general. But they also had a particular impact on Spain and Portugal. The modernization contributed to the aspect of identity. New equipment had a psychological effect on the military, for it actually benefited from the change in

regimes. This further fostered the integration processes of the Iberian militaries into the realm of democratic societies.

Although they are not members of NATO, this aspect is nevertheless relevant to the cases of Eastern Europe. Financial assistance and cooperation in the field of equipment and technology would increase the effectiveness of the Eastern European armies and would make the militaries more responsive to the new democratic systems. In addition it would consolidate contacts and strengthen ties between East and West.

So far, the United States provides assistance for Eastern Europe in the field of military-educational training.<sup>239/</sup> A comparison with the assistance given to Spain (chapter IV.A.1) and Portugal (chapter IV.B.1) earlier, however, shows the limited engagement of the United States in Eastern Europe.<sup>240/</sup>

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<sup>239/</sup> In the fiscal year 1992, each of the three Eastern European countries received an estimated 75,000 US\$. In the fiscal year of 1991, the figures were 310,000 for Czechoslovakia, 275,000 for Hungary and 407,000 for Poland; according to "AID"  
(Agency for International Development)

<sup>240/</sup> The lack of available data on the engagement of the EC and its member states makes a conclusion on European outside powers obsolete.

## B. Internal Threats

### 1. Economic Problems

As discussed above, the consequences of the economic performances of the particular countries are twofold. The securance of a decent material standard for the individual soldiers reduces the threat of a military intervention. Also, the distribution of wealth and the provision of economic benefits to broad sectors of society eases social tensions. As seen in chapter III.A.1. Eastern Europe is suffering from various economic setbacks, which hinder the implementation of a market economy. High inflation, unemployment, price increases and a low industrial output are the current distinctive marks.

This research is not able to offer solutions in handling the economic crises. Numerous economists and western financial expertise discussed and offered various approaches, often with only slight success. Instead, this research hopes to contribute to the discussion through a comparative look at Spain and Portugal.

The similarities between Iberia and Eastern Europe are compelling. Both suffered from their inherited economic system, with insufficient structures. In both cases capitalist management and financial skill were either limited or absent. Spain and Portugal were dependent on foreign investment, capital and technology. The two Iberian nations were not able to consolidate their economies and

thus to stabilize their regimes without foreign help. Spain and Portugal were able to create a "European connection", through an increase in trade relations and eventually with the accession to the EC. Europe was the safeguard for economic recovery and therefore fostered democracy on the Iberian peninsula.

Today, the same prospect is valid for Eastern Europe. Only with the help of outside powers can the region provide an acceptable material standard so vital for its security and for the stabilization of democracy.

In Eastern Europe, the process of a transformation from a socialist into a capitalist economy is hampered by the lack of historic experiences which would provide guidance. It requires western expertise and market experience. Outside powers, which include European as well as non-European nations, can provide assistance on three levels: sub-governmental actors, the individual governments and supra-national organizations, such as the EC, the IMF or the World Bank.

On the sub-governmental level private enterprises need to take action. The private sectors of western countries can arrange technology transfers and joint-venture programs. All three Eastern European countries lack a proper banking system, a vital element, not only for the economic infrastructure but also for the provision of credits and for

the modernization of Eastern European companies. So far, private banks are engaged in Eastern Europe through the development of representative offices, the involvement in joint venture banks, investments in the leasing and insurance market and the training of bank managers which provides for a know-how input. But private banks are opposed to take over the responsibility in financing the necessary economic reforms. In this context, Eastern Europe needs to address international financial institutions and western governments.<sup>241/</sup>

Tourism functioned as a booming sector in the economic progress of Spain and Portugal. An adequate tourist infrastructure already exists only in some parts in Eastern Europe (Budapest, the Balaton region, Prague). Although Eastern Europe might not evolve into a target for mass tourism, the region undoubtedly has a sufficient attractiveness. Cultural ties of former refugees, now living in western Europe, and the restricted travel opportunities during communist rule produce an interest and a curiosity for visiting the region.

Tourism offers open space for investment. Apart from the economic benefits, the Iberian societies were exposed to western lifestyles prior to the departure from authoritarian rule which helped pave the road for the democratic transition.

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<sup>241/</sup> see: Klaus Schroeder, 1991, pp.331



Tourism and therefore also western culture had a significant impact on Eastern Europe. As far as they could penetrate the iron curtain, the general confrontation with western lifestyles and behavior and the display of wealth exposed the economic and materialistic weaknesses of the communist system. Capitalism and western culture set a normative standard, whilst the realization of this material dream represented one cause to start the revolutionary transformation.

It remains arguable if this cultural exposure should be regarded as a positive experience, but in Spain and Portugal it undoubtedly represented a break with the authoritarian past and an integration within the western world.

So far, western companies and entrepreneurs seek their chances in opening businesses in Eastern Europe. Four decades of a state-run economy left plenty of consumer niches for investment. As of October 1992, U.S. estimates account for 300 U.S. businesses operating in Czechoslovakia.<sup>242/</sup> Between September 1991 and April 1992, total U.S. investment in Czechoslovakia amounted to US\$ 1.3 billion.<sup>243/</sup> In Hungary, foreign investment of US\$ 1.5 billion poured into the country in 1991.<sup>244/</sup> Various investment opportunities and an expanding market attract

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<sup>242/</sup> New York Times, October 21, 1992, p.D1

<sup>243/</sup> New York Times, June 21, 1992, Section 3, p.1

<sup>244/</sup> New York Times, May 03, 1992, p.F5

foreign money. Still, market capitalism and investment are often hampered and even distracted by an inefficient bureaucracy and sometimes confusing legal restrictions and obligations.

On the governmental level, apart from financial assistance, the western world can offer inexpensive help - advice. The experience of the "Treuhandanstalt" in Germany with the unification process in terms of privatization can be of high importance to Eastern Europe. Furthermore it would involve highly qualified western expertise. Western countries can advise Eastern Europe in establishing an adequate and functioning administration, especially in the public sector. Western governments can also foster a proper economic climate by giving export guarantees and by granting tax benefits to companies investing in Eastern Europe.

As Joseph Pozsgai<sup>245/</sup> suggested, Hungary, but also Czechoslovakia, deserve a restructuring of their foreign debts. It seems rather cynical that new regimes, devoted to human rights, democracy and market economy have to take over the debts inherited by communist dictatorship. In this context, The Polish effort for a redefinition has succeeded. The foreign debtors remitted 50 per cent, the United States even 70 per cent of the Polish debt in March 1991.<sup>246/</sup> Debt

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<sup>245/</sup> Joseph Pozsgai, 1991, p.123

<sup>246/</sup> see: Klaus Schroeder, 1991, p.327

rescheduling and remission for Hungary and Poland remains to be done.

According to Klaus Schroeder, the total volume of debt will rise significantly. At the end of 1995, Czechoslovakia would have to pay US\$ 1.1 billion, Poland US\$ 4 billion and Hungary US\$ 2.5 billion.<sup>247/</sup> Pozsgai therefore suggests that Eastern Europe should be granted a moratorium on repayment of five to seven years, to concentrate all economic forces on the privatization<sup>248/</sup> which represents the biggest obstacle to economic progress.

So far, individual countries seem rather reluctant in their financial support. The United States for instance did not provide any economic or development assistance in the fiscal years of 1990 and 1991 through its "Agency of International Development". In September 1991, the "U.S Information Agency" and "AID" announced an US\$ 18 million program involving 32 colleges with the aim of training faculty in management and market economics. An additional US\$ 45 million was invested in a program by the American business and private sector.<sup>249/</sup> It seems that the

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<sup>247/</sup> in: Klaus Schroeder, 1991, p.334

Schroeder added all aggregate capital transfers -either planned or already in progress- of international financial organizations and western governments. His estimate is based on the current interest rates.

<sup>248/</sup> Joseph Pozsgai, 1991, p.123

<sup>249/</sup> U.S Department of State Dispatch:  
September 2, 1991, p.662; April 8, 1991, p.247

individual countries follow a policy of rendering the responsibility to supra-national organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank or the European Community. In this context, no data on bilateral cooperations was available.

On the supra-national level, the IMF provides extensive funds to its new members of Eastern Europe. In addition, the World Bank also launched credit programs.<sup>250/</sup> The European Community however has to fulfill the most important part in improving the Eastern European economies. For the fostering of the economic progress, a close cooperation with Eastern Europe is essential. No other model provides such economic prosperity than the EC. The Community has the experience, expertise, as well as the institutions for a political dialogue and a closer cooperation on the governmental level. It is the "world's greatest trading power and the world's most generous provider for development aid".<sup>251/</sup>

For Spain and Portugal, the accession into the EC represented the strongest and most effective link of their "European connection". Would, however an accession of Eastern Europe achieve the same merits -democratic

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<sup>250/</sup> The IMF-agreements are scheduled for 1992 until 1994. Within this period Poland receives US\$ 2.5 billion, Hungary and Czechoslovakia US\$ 1.8 billion. The World Bank plans a US\$ 10 billion credit limit for the entire region; in: Klaus Schroeder, 1991, p.332

<sup>251/</sup> Werner Ungerer, 1990, p.227

integration and economic recovery- as it did for the Iberian nations?

The Community finds itself in a crisis with crumbling currencies, economic setbacks and public opposition in several member states against the unification process. In terms of an accession of Eastern Europe, two opposing attitudes collide: "intensification" versus "enlargement".<sup>252/</sup> The prospects of a new European order are within two extremes. On one side a highly integrated EC of twelve, with a hegemonic position over the rest of Europe and on the other side a greater EC, almost identical with the European CSCE members.

The accession question is not limited to the Eastern European countries. The already submitted applications of Malta, Cyprus, Turkey, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and Finland must also be taken into account. An enlargement of the EC would then mean at least 22 members.

Under these circumstances it is extremely doubtful whether the envisaged goal of a European Union can be achieved.<sup>253/</sup> The development of a common foreign policy, common military policy and common currency as set forth by the "Maastricht-treaty" would be hard to accomplish. A greater EC of 22 members will hardly go beyond the integration level of an enlarged free trade area. The

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<sup>252/</sup> see: Gerhard Wettig, 1992, p.236

<sup>253/</sup> see: Heinz Kramer, 1992, p.13

additional costs for an extension might also strain the countries' budget and might therefore result in a negative response among the people towards the concept of Europe in general.

On the other side, an intensification of the Community of the "Twelve" would prolong the division of Europe. Such a denial of an accession for Eastern Europe would leave the possibility of an emergence of a zone of instability which can be neither in the European security nor in its economic interest. To face the current challenges the EC therefore is in need of a fundamental change. As a compromise, a proposal by Heinz Kramer from the "Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik" in Germany calls for a

"European system of varying integrated circles", ... where..."economically weaker states could be incorporated into internal market integration via catching-up models designed in analogy to the envisaged EMU-EC, without having to fully fulfill their functional criteria.<sup>254/</sup>

With the establishment of the core European Monetary Union, the EC would represent the most integrated circle, which could then be followed with a similar differentiation and varying membership circles towards a political union. This could account for a relatively early, although limited incorporation of Eastern Europe.

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<sup>254/</sup> Heinz Kramer, 1992, p.19



Whatever the future direction of the EC will be, the Community has to clarify its position. A 12-member European intensification and a broad European integration process are irreconcilable under the current concept of a European Union. However, a very close cooperation and integration is vital for Eastern Europe. "Go West" is the only solution for Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Their economies cannot develop by relying mainly on internal trade among the three or with the republics of the former Soviet Union or with other former members of the defunct WTO. All of these countries are themselves confronted with enormous problems. They are not in the position to provide an economic boost. The Community has to take over or at least share the responsibility. It is the most decisive force on which economic prosperity and thus a political stabilization is dependent on.

So far, the association agreements (also called "European agreements"), negotiated in early 1992 with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia illustrate the EC's dilemma in choosing between "intensification" or "enlargement". The treaties represent a middle way between these two poles. The question of a subsequent membership is deliberately kept open. Priority is given to "efforts to promote the integration of these countries into the western-style international economic and political system".<sup>255/</sup> The

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<sup>255/</sup> Heinz Kramer, 1992, p.14

EC will remove trade barriers to give access for Eastern European industrial goods. But restrictions in the agricultural sector and for sensitive industrial goods (textiles, iron, steel and coal) undermine this generous effort.<sup>256/</sup> The treaty further mentions technical assistance, training and education, the promotion of scientific research and technological development; measures designed to support structural change.<sup>257/</sup> The efforts by the EC show a remarkable ambition to help and integrate Eastern Europe. But this current willingness has to be transformed into a long-term cooperation to overcome the economic problems.

Here, a look at past experiences seems appropriate. In Spain negotiations for accession were almost in vain, for the new regime did not manage to incorporate the military into the democratic society. Apart from the loss of an ideological base, economic and material aspects accounted for a number of coups.

The European Community was initially reluctant to support the new Spanish democracy. With negotiations for an accession virtually deadlocked, Spain questioned its future and position within Europe. The military was opposed to the

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<sup>256/</sup> see: Heinz Kramer, 1992, p.15

<sup>257/</sup> In addition the "European Bank for Reconstruction and Development" provides credit of approx. US\$ 16 billion (1992 to 1999) in: Klaus Schroeder, 1992, p.333.

"westernization" of society, while the government and the people threw doubt upon the necessity of NATO for Spain.

It was not until the meetings in Dublin in 1984, nine years after Franco's death, that the community gave a strong sign of support with the prospect of accession. In this period, the European commitment to integrate Spain was vague. It resulted in various internal crises.

The situation in Eastern Europe has similar potentials. The region needs a democratic anchor, needs assistance and guidance. A lack of support, a delay of the integration process into Europe and a struggling economy can severely test the patience of a country in terms of the acceptance of the political and economic systems.

In this context, the EC should bridge the period of accession by acting as a chairman of emergency, and create a fund designed for quick assistance.<sup>258/</sup> The years of regime crises and coups in Spain in the early 1980's showed that determined action by outside powers is necessary to prevent a surrender of the new members of the free world to despotism and authoritarianism.

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<sup>258/</sup> Klaus Schroeder, 1991, p.335

This "Stability Fund for Europe" should be set up by the European Bank for Recovery and Development"

## 2. Rejection of Capitalism and Apathy towards Democracy

The current rejection of Capitalism and the apathy towards the democratization process in Eastern Europe are clear signs that people are disappointed over the outcome, especially their own personal, political and material benefits of the revolutions. Rejection and apathy are negative and almost nihilistic attitudes. The optimistic spirit of the revolutionary days changed into passivity. The benefits of the new economic and political concepts differ widely from the people's expectations at the outset of the revolutions. These tendencies ultimately threaten the new regimes. They will increase with economic failure, and political surrender of democracy becomes more likely.

The success story of West-Germany's departure from the Nazi-dictatorship offers an appropriate example. The economic prosperity represented the backbone of the new German democracy. Broad parts of society benefited from Capitalism. Although the completion of the economic miracle took fifteen years, a positive perception of the economic performance existed from the early 1950's on. "Things are looking up" was the motto of the post war era and transformed into a solid acceptance of democracy. The individual's economic benefits provided for an approval of the organizing principles of society: Democracy and

Capitalism.<sup>259/</sup> In West-Germany, positive economic performances had a powerful impact on the establishment and the approval of democracy.

It takes time to turn people, used to authoritarian rule for four decades, into citizens who approve the transformation and who are convinced that Democracy and Capitalism serve their needs best. The case of Portugal shows that apathy, the glorification of the past and traditional, authoritarian modes of behavior serve as a hotbed for populist movements and anti-democratic notions. But Portugal also showed that these tensions decrease with a positive economic performance that grants economic benefits to the citizens.

Economic prosperity is not an exclusive guarantor of democracy but it undoubtedly fosters its establishment. Capitalism and Democracy are intertwined. A democratic political system can rely on public support, when it produces economic prosperity and provides for a wide distribution of wealth to broad parts of society.

The public approval of Capitalism and Democracy is so far limited in Eastern Europe. The task is to legitimize

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<sup>259/</sup> This material orientation in establishing a new society culminated in an identity crisis in the late 1960's. Intellectuals as well as the Student revolts of 1968 criticized the exclusiveness of the new materialistic cognitive base, which limited the confrontation with the Nazi-past and prevented the transformation of the authoritarian German character into democratic values and attitudes.

them, in order to wipe away possible intentions to a return to authoritarian forms of government. This task cannot be fulfilled by Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia alone. It asks for help and cooperation. For decades, the European continent was divided into two spheres. History offered the people of Europe a unique chance: to unite not only Germany, but the whole of Europe. A close cooperation, financial and personal assistance and an economic integration within the established capitalist economies of Europe are just the first steps, but they are essential to achieve this goal.

### 3. Ethnonationalism

As illustrated by the Spanish case, institutional arrangements which grant a decent amount of autonomy are one way to ease tensions. But political violence still is a severe problem for the country. In addition, cooperation served as a further means to reduce the threat to the Spanish democracy.

Here, the institutions of the EC are ill-equipped. The EC represents an arena for consultation and political dialogue on the highest governmental levels. Although the Maastricht-treaty calls for a increased anti-terrorist cooperation, its institutions, however, lack the authority to manage rising ethnic tensions or conflicts in Eastern Europe.



The same applies to NATO. Its task is the provision of a broad security agenda and does not address solutions for regional problems. The need for a new security organization becomes apparent, when looking at the current security threats to Europe which show hardly any resemblance to the threats that NATO was confronted with in its founding days.

Here a proposal by Gregory Flynn and David Scheffer for a further development of the CSCE seems appropriate <sup>260/</sup>. The CSCE includes all members of NATO, the defunct Warsaw Pact and most of Europe's neutrals. Until recently, the CSCE was limited to meetings on security, economic and human rights issues.<sup>261/</sup> According to Flynn and Scheffer, the CSCE has to gain more power and influence through the creation of a secretariat and its own peace keeping forces. The CSCE would provide an intergovernmental forum with specific councils which have the ability to address specific issues, related to the region's problems, that cannot be covered by the overarching NATO-structure. Councils would include cooperation on military and environmental issues as well as on ethnic affairs.

Also, the recent establishment of the new Conflict Prevention Center has a high potency. The Center's current focus is on a limited range of military matters, such as information on military forces and their activities, and

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<sup>260/</sup> Gregory Flynn and David Scheffer, 1990, p.77-101

<sup>261/</sup> Jenonne Walker, 1991, p.137

military budgets. But it could broaden its agenda by addressing internal practices or the treatment of minorities which might threaten the peace, thus urging moderation and communication.<sup>262/</sup> An additional proposal envisages the Center as an arena for politico-military security matters, with arms control and disarmament measures.<sup>263/</sup>

Furthermore, the organization would not undermine NATO -the Alliance would still be regarded as the "bedrock of Western security"<sup>264/</sup> and a new CSCE would provide a framework to integrate the former Soviet republics and to absorb Germany. Finally, as a voting member in the CSCE, the United States would be directly involved in finding solutions for the regions. Due to the paramount significance of an economic recovery, the main task of reducing the internal threats to democracy has to be fulfilled by European nations, for Europe is equipped with the most suitable institution, the EC. But Europe would be foolish to renounce a U.S. American assistance and cooperation. Knowledge, technological and economic capabilities and a long experience in fostering European democracies can do no harm to the democratization process in Eastern Europe. CSCE would provide such an arena for the contribution of the United States.

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<sup>262/</sup> Jenonne Walker, 1991, p.139

<sup>263/</sup> Michael Alexander, 1991, p.12

<sup>264/</sup> Gregory Flynn and David Scheffer, 1990, p.95

### C. External Threats

Due to the absence of external threats, the Iberian cases do not offer any suggestions. The external threats in Eastern Europe are related to the unstable and so far unpredictable development processes in the new republics of the former Soviet Union and in the bordering countries of the former allies of the Warsaw pact.

Some scholars have suggested that NATO should not be tempted to get involved in Eastern Europe. "Bringing East European states under at least the Alliance's political umbrella, would isolate Moscow,... making Europe less secure in the long run."<sup>265/</sup>

But the integration of the former Soviet republics within the CSCE limits the prospect of isolation, in case NATO focuses on Eastern Europe. Instead, various security matters have to be handled by the CSCE, which still has the potency to evolve as a framework for integrating Russia and the republics into a European security. Second, the various democratization processes in the former USSR are as yet incomplete, whereas Eastern Europe had undergone significant personal, ideological and constitutional changes. It should be essential for the free world to secure and safeguard their development.

Therefore, the only solution to close this security gap is NATO. The Alliance is needed as a stabilizing factor in

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<sup>265/</sup> Jenonne Walker, 1991, p.134

the region. It would further provide the United States with a role as "arbiter and balancing power".<sup>266/</sup> NATO is an essential forum for political consultation and currently the only body in which the United States as well as Canada sit down alongside with European countries. Its military capability is still a crucial contribution to the European security. The existing institutions in Europe are themselves too weak to guarantee a stable security. The recent example of Yugoslavia indicates that neither the CSCE nor the European Community had the capability to control the crisis.

The situation in Russia is highly unpredictable. Although the country is pursuing the path towards democracy, the process is far from being secure. Changes in the regime type and the political system are still possible and need to be taken in account when referring to a proper Eastern European security. The CSCE therefore cannot function as a substitute for NATO, since Russia has a veto over CSCE actions.<sup>267/</sup>

The Maastricht-treaty, its rejection by a Danish referendum and the close public referendum in France showed that the shape and timing of a European unity are still uncertain. In this context, the role of the Western European Union (WEU) needs further clarification. The Maastricht-treaty calls for a European defense system that is separated

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<sup>266/</sup> Henry Kissinger, 1992, p.19

<sup>267/</sup> Jenonne Walker, 1991, p.140

but still "linked" to NATO and open to all members to the EC as an expanded version of the WEU.<sup>268/</sup> Also, France and Germany announced the formation of an operational corps of 35.000 men by 1995 and asked the members of the WEU to join.<sup>269/</sup>

It seems essential for Europe to create its own defense system that will eventually succeed Nato as the safeguard for European security. Europe has to take over more responsibilities in light of its gradual evolution into an economic super power and due to a possible withdrawal of American troops. However, only confusion exists over the various proposals and initiatives. So far, Europe remains incapable of closing the security gap. The Gulf War in 1991 showed the inadequate response of Europe. Thus, European action on security as well as the development of a defence identity are so far limited.<sup>270/</sup>

Furthermore, united Germany emerged as a continental political and economic superpower. France and Great Britain are both too weak to stop an eventual expansion of German nationalism over Europe and especially over its eastern part. As Henry Kissinger noted, "Germany has become so strong, that existing European institutions cannot by

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<sup>268/</sup> in: Washington Post, December 11, 1991, p.A30

<sup>269/</sup> in: New York Times, May 23, 1992, p.A1

<sup>270/</sup> see: Michael Alexander, 1991, p.13

themselves establish a balance between Germany and its partners".<sup>271/</sup>

NATO is also needed to provide Eastern Europe with a guarantee against other external threats that might evolve from the unstable situation in Byelorussia, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Russia and Romania. Only NATO would give reasonable answers to these security questions. As discussed in chapter V.A. a full incorporation of the Eastern European militaries is not applicable. But this does not exclude the possibility that NATO should give Eastern Europe a security guarantee, while border violations should be judged as a challenge to western security.

Lately, the Alliance took a more active position in responding to the vital political changes. Together with five members from the former Warsaw Bloc and with eight of the fifteen former Soviet republics, NATO founded the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991. It functions mainly as a forum at the level of foreign ministers to discuss military reductions and to coordinate security policies between the states as a means of creating greater stability.<sup>272/</sup>

Also, NATO agreed to take over a peace-keeping role in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.<sup>273/</sup> But its

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<sup>271/</sup> Henry Kissinger, 1992, p.19

<sup>272/</sup> see: New York Times, June 06, 1991, p.A5

<sup>273/</sup> see: New York Times, June 05, 1992, p.1



commitment is limited. First, NATO will only take action when asked to do so by the CSCE. But with a veto power by Russia, emerging security threats caused by Moscow would not be covered. Second, a complete security guarantee would have a preventive-deterrent element. In its communique however, NATO is only willing to counteract security threats on a case-by-case basis.

In search of a new role in the aftermath of the cold war, NATO took a small step towards a readjustment of its European security concept. From the ideological confrontation of two opposing state societies, it narrowed its focus to a particular region and probably to individual states that are not directly integrated within its structure. With its enemy the Warsaw Pact gone, the safeguarding of the East-European democratization processes can serve as a new function for the Alliance.

In addition, NATO accounts for the involvement of the United States in the democratic transformation of the Eastern European countries. Through NATO the U.S. can provide some assurance against any eventual expansionism from the republics of the former Soviet Union. The role of NATO is crucial. The Alliance must help in keeping the level of external threats as low as possible. This reduction of external pressure would in return decrease internal tensions. With a supportive NATO, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia need not enlarge their militaries and would

enable them to direct more resources towards internal problems.

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